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Instrumental Music and the First Amendment 
Alan K. Chen* 
This Article critically examines what would seem to be, but is not, an easy free speech 
question: whether instrumental music falls within the scope of the First Amendment. 
The Supreme Court has long recognized that musical expression is “speech,” but has 
never analyzed why this is the case. Similarly, scholarly literature is surprisingly bereft 
of any comprehensive examination of whether there are sound theoretical or doctrinal 
foundations for treating purely instrumental music as a form of constitutionally 
protected expression. This Article engages this question comprehensively, and argues 
that there are two strong claims for the coverage of instrumental music under the First 
Amendment. First, instrumental music can be understood as speech because of its 
central role in expressing cultural, religious, nationalist, and other social values that 
might otherwise be at risk of government control and orthodoxy. Second, music serves 
a unique communicative function as a facilitator of emotional expression, experience, 
and autonomy. 
 
In examining these claims, the Article first surveys existing judicial and scholarly 
treatments of music as speech to illustrate how our understanding of the expressive 
value of instrumental music has been undertheorized. It then briefly catalogues 
historical and contemporary instances of instrumental music censorship by 
governments and other powerful institutions both within the United States and in other 
nations. First Amendment theory does not offer an obvious explanation for why 
instrumental music should be protected. Thus, the Article next considers the three 
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dominant theoretical justifications for protection of expression—promotion of 
democratic self-governance; facilitation of the search for truth; and protection of 
autonomy through self-realization—and explores the possibilities for and limits of 
employing any of these three theories to justify protection of instrumental music. 
 
To truly understand how these speech theories might apply, however, one must first 
comprehend the nature of instrumental musical expression. Accordingly, this Article 
next discusses exactly what it is that instrumental music expresses and how it does so, 
and examines how those conceptualizations fit within the frameworks of the three 
dominant speech theories. This Part concludes with an elaboration of the claim that 
music is like speech because of its unique power to convey cultural and other social 
values and promote emotional expression and experience in its composers, performers, 
and listeners. Music, then, falls within both the truth-seeking and self-realization 
justifications for the First Amendment. In contrast, theoretical explanations for free 
speech grounded in democracy do not map well onto non-lyrical musical expression. 
 
Finally, this Article argues that a better understanding of the relationship between 
instrumental music and the First Amendment may illuminate free speech theory more 
broadly. First, it moves the recent discourse on First Amendment “coverage” forward 
by examining a context that requires consideration of nonrepresentational expression in 
its purest form. Second, clarification about the valid justifications for coverage of 
instrumental music has important ramifications for how we think about the regulation 
of other artistic expression as well as other types of nonverbal expression, such as non-
obscene pornography and subliminal advertising. 
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Introduction 
“After silence, that which comes nearest to expressing the inexpressible 
is music.” 
—Aldous Huxley, The Rest is Silence, in Music at Night 19, 19 
(1931). 
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If a picture is worth a thousand words, what about a C#? Or the 
flatted third, fifth, or seventh note in a blues scale? Or a glissando, or 
other run of musical notes strung together in a particular sequence and 
rhythm, such as a Gregorian chant, the first four notes of Beethoven’s 
Fifth Symphony, the syncopated piano introduction to Dave Brubeck’s 
“Blue Rondo À La Turk,” or the trademark guitar riff at the opening of 
Jimi Hendrix’s “Purple Haze”? The Supreme Court and lower courts 
have long accepted that musical expression falls within the category of 
“speech” safeguarded by the First Amendment.1 But no court has ever 
explained in any meaningful way why the musical, as opposed to lyrical, 
component of such expression is independently covered by the 
Constitution. There has been no comprehensive examination of the 
reasons justifying the constitutional coverage and protection of the tonal 
and rhythmic elements that define what we recognize as instrumental 
music. 
The scholarly literature is also surprisingly bereft of comprehensive 
discussions of the theoretical or doctrinal foundations for treating purely 
instrumental music as expression under the Constitution. Typically, 
music2 is treated as an aside or is lumped in for discussion with other 
forms of nonverbal artistic expression, such as painting and sculpture.3 
Commentators have paid far less attention to the unique elements of 
pure musical expression.4 In this Article, I attempt to fill that gap by 
examining, challenging, and defending the conclusion that instrumental 
music is speech and is worthy of robust First Amendment protection 
 
 1. See, e.g., Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Grp. of Boston, 515 U.S. 557, 
569 (1995); Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 790 (1989); Nurre v. Whitehead, 580 F.3d 
1087, 1093 (9th Cir. 2009). 
 2. For the most part, when I refer to “music” throughout this Article, I mean instrumental music. 
 3. A number of scholars have done excellent work engaging the broader topic of art and 
freedom of expression. See, e.g., Randall P. Bezanson, Art and Freedom of Speech (2009) 
[hereinafter Bezanson, Art and Freedom]; Amy Adler, What’s Left?: Hate Speech, Pornography, 
and the Problem for Artistic Expression, 84 Calif. L. Rev. 1499 (1996); Randall P. Bezanson, Art and 
the Constitution, 93 Iowa L. Rev. 1593 (2008) [hereinafter Bezanson, Art and the Constitution]; 
Edward J. Eberle, Art as Speech, 11 U. Pa. J.L. & Soc. Change 1 (2007); Marci A. Hamilton, Art 
Speech, 49 Vand. L. Rev. 73 (1996); Sheldon H. Nahmod, Artistic Expression and Aesthetic Theory: 
The Beautiful, the Sublime and the First Amendment, 1987 Wis. L. Rev. 221; Mark Tushnet, Art and 
the First Amendment, 35 Colum. J.L. & Arts 169 (2012). 
 4. A recent, but valuable exception is a student note. See David Munkittrick, Note, Music as 
Speech: A First Amendment Category Unto Itself, 62 Fed. Comm. L.J. 665 (2010); see also Tushnet, 
supra note 3, at 203 n.117 (describing Munkittrick’s note as “one of the few efforts to analyze music’s 
First Amendment coverage”). Music has been discussed in other legal literature as a model for legal 
interpretation, but that work is not directly relevant to the issues I consider in this Article. See 
generally Jack M. Balkin, Verdi’s High C, 91 Tex. L. Rev. 1687 (2013); Sanford Levinson & J. M. 
Balkin, Law, Music, and Other Performing Arts, 139 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1597 (1991) (comparing legal 
interpretation to musicians’ interpretation of scores with strict or liberal construction of the 
composers’ intent); Richard A. Posner, Bork and Beethoven, 42 Stan. L. Rev. 1365 (1990) (reviewing 
Robert H. Bork, The Tempting of America: The Political Seduction of the Law (1989)). 
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comparable to the safeguards that are commonplace for most verbal 
expression. In doing so, I offer what I hope to be the first full theoretical 
account supporting the idea that instrumental musical expression is 
constitutionally equivalent to speech. 
Instrumental music is a somewhat curious free speech topic. Perhaps 
it has not received serious attention in First Amendment doctrine and 
theory because it is inaccurately perceived to be an easy question. It is 
likely, for example, that most professional and lay observers instinctively 
believe instrumental music is constitutionally protected. It is difficult to 
imagine a functioning democracy in which the state could control the 
communication of musical notes and rhythms any more than we would 
tolerate, in most cases, the regulation of pure speech. Moreover, we also 
cannot imagine circumstances in which such censorship would occur. It 
seems implausible that the government or other institutional powers 
would restrict instrumental music or that they would ever have a reason 
to do so. 
Yet, they have. In just the past few years, two federal appellate 
courts upheld the actions of local school districts that had banned 
exclusively instrumental music from performance by students during 
public school programs because of the music’s religious content.5 In both 
cases, the school districts successfully defeated the students’ free speech 
claims by arguing that the Establishment Clause required them to avoid 
endorsing religious speech, and in one case, on the ground that the state 
had the authority to control musical content because of the limited 
nature of schools as a public forum.6 
Federally licensed broadcasters and private businesses influenced by 
the Recording Industry Association of America (“RIAA”) have 
prohibited or regulated purely instrumental music.7 In Israel, there was, 
until relatively recently, an informal, though widely implemented ban on 
the performance of works composed by Richard Wagner.8 And while 
censorship of music in democratic states has been relatively rare, 
totalitarian regimes throughout history have wielded state power to 
censor instrumental music they viewed with suspicion. Instrumental 
music bans were commonplace in Nazi Germany and the former Soviet 
 
 5. See Stratechuk v. Bd. of Educ., 587 F.3d 597, 610 (3d Cir. 2009); Nurre v. Whitehead, 580 F.3d 
1087, 1090 (9th Cir. 2009). 
 6. See Stratechuk, 587 F.3d at 610; Nurre, 580 F.3d at 1090.  
 7. See Eric Nuzum, Parental Advisory: Music Censorship in America 254–55 (2001); Adam 
Bernstein, Guitarist Link Wray Dies; Influenced Punk, Grunge, Wash. Post, Nov. 22, 2005, at B5; 
Martin Horsfield, This Record Must Not Be Broadcast, Guardian, Sept. 20, 2008, at 25. Of course, 
instances of censorship of music because of its lyrics have also occurred. See, e.g., Luke Records, Inc. 
v. Navarro, 960 F.2d 134, 135 (11th Cir. 1992). 
 8. See Munkittrick, supra note 4, at 673–74. 
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Republic.9 More contemporary examples of censorship can be found in 
other cultures, particularly those with sectarian-dominated government 
regimes, such as Iran and the Taliban-controlled Afghanistan.10 As a 
basis for the later discussion of First Amendment theory, Part I of this 
Article surveys the slim judicial and scholarly treatments of music as 
speech to illustrate how our understanding of the expressive value of 
instrumental music has been undertheorized, and then briefly catalogues 
these historical and contemporary instances of the censorship of 
instrumental music. 
Though instrumental music is probably widely understood as a form 
of expression, current theory and doctrine do not offer an easy 
explanation for why it should fall within the scope of the First 
Amendment. Thus, Part II of this Article surveys the three dominant 
theoretical justifications for protection of free expression—promotion of 
democratic self-governance; facilitation of the search for truth; and 
protection of autonomy through self-realization—and explores the 
possibilities for and limits of employing any of these three theories to 
justify protection of instrumental music. Theoretical explanations for 
free speech grounded in the promotion of democratic self-governance11 
do not map well onto non-lyrical musical expression. Nor is it self-
evident that protection of instrumental music is necessary to protect the 
marketplace of ideas in order to facilitate the search for truth, at least 
without embracing an unbounded definition of truth. Autonomy-based 
justifications for protection of expression provide what is probably the 
most intuitive basis for understanding instrumental music as speech. But 
as we will see, autonomy arguments for speech are also vulnerable to 
boundary claims, and a full exploration of the issue at hand must address 
those claims and precisely articulate what autonomy means in the context 
of the right to compose, perform, and listen to instrumental music. 
The most fundamental challenge of harmonizing instrumental music 
with the dominant free speech theories is discerning exactly what it is 
 
 9. See Jonathan Green, Encyclopedia of Censorship 590 (Nicholas J. Karolides ed., 2d ed. 
2005); Michael Haas, Forbidden Music: The Jewish Composers Banned by the Nazis 226, 231–35 
(2013); Erik Levi, Music in the Third Reich 86 (1994); Allan Kozinn, Mendelssohn, This Is Your 
Moment, N.Y. Times, Feb. 22, 2009, at AR29; Mansur Mirovalev, Once-Banned Shostakovich Ballet 
Triumphs, Wash. Post (June 15, 2007, 3:27 PM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/ 
article/2007/06/15/AR2007061501128_pf.html. 
 10. Stephen Moss, The Hills Are Alive, Guardian, Nov. 15, 2001, at A2. But see Umar F. Abd-
Allah, Living Islam with Purpose, 7 UCLA J. Islamic & Near E. L. 17, 24, 30–31 (2008) (observing 
that the Islamic view on instrumental music is not “immutably fixed” and that some minority 
viewpoints would permit music to be performed in some contexts); Robert Tait, Iran’s “Culturally 
Inappropriate” Rock Hopefuls Struggle To Be Heard, Guardian, Aug. 23, 2005, at 13. 
 11. See Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 Ind. L.J. 1 
(1971). 
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that such music expresses and how it does so. Thus, Part III explores five 
possible ways of viewing instrumental music as speech and examines how 
those conceptualizations might fit within the frameworks of the three 
dominant speech theories. First, I explore whether the First Amendment 
might cover instrumental music because of the music’s appeal to the 
cognitive. Instrumental music may evoke or be associated with specific 
thoughts, ideas, or concepts that provoke cognitive responses or 
functions in listeners. Music may also be expressive to the degree that it 
enhances or colors other communicative vehicles in ways that make their 
messages more effective. A third possibility is that instrumental music 
does, in fact, have a direct cognitive component that thus far has been 
unstudied and unappreciated. Ultimately, however, I conclude that none 
of the cognitive theories are sufficient to support the claim that music is 
speech. 
Next, I examine two different, but compelling, conceptions of 
instrumental music’s communicative value. First, throughout history, the 
composition, performance, and auditory consumption of musical 
expression has played an essential role in forming, shaping, maintaining, 
and distinguishing values of culture, religion, and nationalism through a 
stunning variety of indigenous music forms and traditions. Second, 
simultaneously (and perhaps coextensively), music has long been 
understood as a unique form of emotional expression and experience for 
its composers, performers, and listeners. 
After canvassing the possible ways of understanding how 
instrumental music communicates, the discussion circles back to examine 
the implications of each of these communicative possibilities for First 
Amendment theory. Ultimately, I argue that the strongest claim for the 
coverage of instrumental music under the First Amendment can be 
derived from its dual role in expressing cultural and other social values 
that might otherwise be at risk of government control and orthodoxy and 
from its function as a facilitator of emotional expression, experience, and 
autonomy. These latter two understandings accept the premise that 
instrumental musical expression is nonrepresentational,12 yet provide 
compelling support for the claim that in serving these functions, music 
advances both the truth-seeking and self-realization objectives of free 
speech theory. 
A greater understanding of instrumental music as speech also has 
substantial value in thinking about other important First Amendment 
 
 12. See generally Tushnet, supra note 3. First Amendment scholars use various terms to describe 
this characteristic of speech. In addition to nonrepresentational, speech that does not convey a 
particular message has been labeled “nonpropositional,” see, e.g., Bezanson, Art and the Constitution, 
supra note 3, at 1596, and “non-ideational,” see, e.g., James Weinstein, Participatory Democracy as the 
Central Value of American Free Speech Doctrine, 97 Va. L. Rev. 491, 499 n.45 (2011). Throughout 
this Article, I use the terms interchangeably. 
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questions. Thus, in Part IV, I briefly explore some of the implications of 
a more thorough account of music as speech. First, the close examination 
of instrumental music follows a broader trend in constitutional law 
scholarship that focuses on the important foundational question of the 
scope of the First Amendment’s coverage, as opposed to the level of its 
constitutional protection.13 If instrumental music is not speech, then we 
never reach the subsequent question of whether it is protected. As 
Frederick Schauer has observed, the answer to the question of “whether 
the First Amendment shows up at all is rarely addressed, and the answer 
is too often simply assumed.”14 Those assumptions dictate results in 
“easy” cases in both directions, as when we assume without discussion 
that criminal threats and securities offerings are not covered by the First 
Amendment, or that art and music are. A better understanding of music 
as speech can meaningfully contribute to this conversation. Second, 
Part IV closes with a brief discussion of how acceptance of one or more 
of my arguments for the coverage of instrumental music may affect the 
way we think about the regulation of other types of nonverbal expression 
that might also claim First Amendment protection, such as non-obscene 
pornography and subliminal or image advertising. It also reflects on the 
necessity of limiting principles that define the boundaries of what 
instrumental music expression ought to be covered by the First 
Amendment and why. 
I.  The Undertheorization of Instrumental Music as Speech 
Although music plays a central role in the social, political, and 
cultural life of most societies, and has been at the center of several 
important judicial disputes, neither the courts nor the academy have 
carefully studied its foundations as a type of speech that triggers 
constitutional protection.15 As the following Subparts suggest, attention 
to this issue has been sparse, incomplete, and unsatisfying. 
 
 13. See generally Frederick Schauer, The Boundaries of the First Amendment: A Preliminary 
Exploration of Constitutional Salience, 117 Harv. L. Rev. 1765 (2004); see also Kent Greenawalt, 
Speech, Crime, and the Uses of Language 54 (1989); John Greenman, On Communication, 106 Mich. 
L. Rev. 1337 (2008); Tushnet, supra note 3 at 174–92; R. George Wright, What Counts as “Speech” in the 
First Place?: Determining the Scope of the Free Speech Clause, 37 Pepp. L. Rev. 1217 (2010). 
 14. Schauer, supra note 13, at 1767. 
 15. First Amendment law is by no means the only area in which music and law uncomfortably 
coexist. See James Boyle, The Public Domain: Enclosing the Commons of the Mind 122 (2008) 
(“Music is hard for copyright law to handle.”); Michael W. Carroll, Whose Music Is It Anyway?: How 
We Came to View Musical Expression as a Form of Property, 72 U. Cin. L. Rev. 1405, 1407 (2004). 
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A. The Courts 
1. Coverage of Nonverbal Expression in General 
It has long been understood that notwithstanding its text privileging 
the “freedom of speech,” the First Amendment’s protection is not 
limited to, and indeed is not defined by, written or oral verbal 
expression. Some nonverbal communication is covered by the First 
Amendment; much verbal expression is not.16 The Supreme Court has 
found the following nonverbal, communicative acts to be covered by the 
free speech clause: flag burning,17 cross burning,18 participating in a 
parade,19 picketing,20 nude dancing,21 and wearing a black armband.22 As 
discussed in detail below, instrumental music and other nonverbal artistic 
expression have also been deemed to be covered, though with very little 
analysis. 
The Court has not been particularly precise about defining when 
nonverbal communication falls within the First Amendment’s coverage. 
Among the tests that it (sometimes) uses to discern between 
communicative acts and uncovered conduct is the one from Spence v. 
Washington.23 Spence challenged his state law conviction for “improper 
use” of a flag when he displayed an upside down American flag on which 
he had placed large peace symbols made of black tape.24 The Court 
underscored that, because Spence did not use “printed or spoken words,” 
it was necessary to evaluate the context in which he acted “to determine 
whether his activity was sufficiently imbued with elements of 
communication to fall within the scope of the First Amendment.”25 
Spence held that nonverbal conduct is speech when the speaker has both 
“[a]n intent to convey a particularized message . . . and in the 
surrounding circumstances the likelihood was great that the message 
would be understood by those who viewed it.”26 The Court concluded 
that Spence’s conduct was covered by the First Amendment because he 
testified that he displayed the flag to express his disagreement with the 
 
 16. Schauer, supra note 13, at 1773. 
 17. United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310, 312 (1990); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 399 (1989). 
 18. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 395–96 (1992). But see Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 
343, 347–48 (2003) (finding that cross burning, while expressive, may be prohibited when accompanied 
by intent to intimidate). 
 19. Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Grp. of Boston, 515 U.S. 557, 559 (1995). 
 20. Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 460 (1980). 
 21. City of Erie v. Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 285 (2000). 
 22. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 505–06 (1969). 
 23. 418 U.S. 405 (1974). 
 24. Id. at 406–07. 
 25. Id. at 409. 
 26. Id. at 410–11. 
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U.S. military’s invasion of Cambodia and his dismay about the shootings 
of student protestors at Kent State University.27 
One might infer from Spence that the intent and understanding 
elements of the Court’s analysis determine whether instrumental musical 
expression and other forms of nonverbal conduct are covered by the 
First Amendment.28 But the Court has not rigidly adhered to the Spence 
test. For example, in the first flag burning case, Texas v. Johnson,29 the 
Court recognized the burning of an American flag as speech, even 
though neither the flag burner’s intent nor the audience’s understanding 
of his message could be said to be particularized.30 The protestor’s conduct 
could have conveyed a broad dissatisfaction with the United States as a 
general matter, or any manner of narrower disagreements with the 
nation’s myriad actions and policies. In National Endowment for the 
Arts v. Finley,31 in which several artists challenged denial of federal 
funding for their work,32 the Court assumed the artwork was expressive 
without even discussing whether such art would convey a specific 
message that would “be understood by those who viewed it.”33 Thus, it is 
not entirely clear that the particularized message requirement is 
essential, a point that becomes important when analyzing instrumental 
music. 
Finley also exposes the Court’s inconsistent application of Spence’s 
intent requirement. The artists in that case specifically argued that art is 
often ambiguous in its meaning and not always intended to convey a 
message.34 Nonetheless, the Court did not dispute the expressive value of 
art in rendering its decision. 
2. Coverage of Instrumental Musical Expression in Particular 
Although the Supreme Court has addressed and embraced the 
constitutional status of musical expression on a handful of occasions, not 
once has it closely examined the premises of its own conclusions. Rather 
than engaging in a careful or thoughtful consideration of music as speech, 
 
 27. Id. at 408, 415. 
 28. Another possibility is that the Court intended the Spence test to apply only to conduct that is 
not self-evidently communicative, and not to forms of nonverbal artistic expression. See Miller v. Civil 
City of S. Bend, 904 F.2d 1081, 1125 (7th Cir. 1990) (Easterbrook, J., dissenting) (suggesting that music 
is not conduct, but is closer to pure speech), rev’d sub nom. Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560 
(1991). If this is the case, then the Court’s failure to invoke Spence in artistic expression cases is more 
understandable, though it has been far from clear in drawing this distinction if that was its intent. 
 29. 491 U.S. 397 (1989). 
 30. Id. at 399, 404–06. 
 31. 524 U.S. 569 (1998). 
 32. Id. at 573. 
 33. Spence, 418 U.S. at 411. 
 34. See Brief for Respondents at 36–37, Nat’l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569 
(1998) (No. 97-371). 
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the Court has instead made superficial assumptions and conveyed lofty, 
unquestioning platitudes.35 Perhaps more to the point, it has never 
broken musical expression down into its essential components—tonal, 
rhythmic, and lyrical—and independently addressed whether each of 
them is covered by the First Amendment. Indeed, the phrase “instrumental 
music” has never appeared in a Supreme Court opinion. Any thoughtful 
analysis of this question requires the disaggregation of the distinct 
components of musical expression to help establish a better foundation 
for understanding why and in what circumstances it ought to be 
constitutionally protected. 
In Ward v. Rock Against Racism,36 the Court examined the First 
Amendment claims of a nonprofit organization that sponsored an annual 
event consisting of speeches and the performance of rock music at a band 
shell in Central Park.37 Responding to complaints of nearby residents 
and park users, New York City adopted new regulations that required 
the organization to use sound equipment and a sound technician 
provided by the city. The organization’s free speech claim was that the 
city’s imposition of these requirements interfered with the performers’ 
expression because the electronic amplification through the equipment 
affected not only the music’s volume, but also the way the sounds were 
mixed.38 The regulation thus altered the content of the musical 
performances by dictating the outcome and quality of the sound. 
While the Court upheld the city’s regulations on the ground that 
they were reasonable restrictions on the manner of speech in a public 
forum, it deemed the predicate claim that music is speech under the First 
Amendment to be self-evident: 
Music is one of the oldest forms of human expression. From Plato’s 
discourse in the Republic to the totalitarian state in our own times, 
rulers have known its capacity to appeal to the intellect and to the 
emotions, and have censored musical compositions to serve the needs 
of the state. The Constitution prohibits any like attempts in our own 
legal order. Music, as a form of expression and communication, is 
protected under the First Amendment. In the case before us . . . the 
constitutional challenge is to the city’s regulation of the musical aspects 
 
 35. As Mark Tushnet observes about the Court’s treatment of the coverage of art in general 
under the First Amendment, it has been “remarkably casual.” Tushnet, supra note 3, at 207. 
 36. 491 U.S. 781 (1989). 
 37. Id. at 784–85. 
 38. The city argued that the plaintiff’s sound technicians might not be as familiar with outdoor 
sound mixing and with the band shell’s acoustics or other surroundings, and that musicians would 
respond to the poor mixing by turning up the volume, thus exacerbating the sound problems the city 
was trying to address. Id. at 786; cf. Cooley v. Bd. of Wardens, 53 U.S. 299, 311 (1851) (examining the 
constitutionality of a statute requiring shipping companies to hire local pilots to navigate their ships 
into port to enhance safety because of the local pilots’ familiarity with the shallow local waters). 
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of the concert; and, based on the principle we have stated, the city’s 
guideline must meet the demands of the First Amendment.39 
Nor did the parties even seriously dispute this proposition.40 However, 
the Court never specified whether the rock performances at issue were 
vocal or instrumental, and therefore did not unpack the different 
components of musical expression and engage in that analysis. Sound 
mixing is necessarily about the construction of sound, but it could affect 
not only the quality of the instrumental components of the performances, 
but also the sound and understandability of lyrics. To the extent that the 
status of instrumental music as speech is in question, Ward did not 
provide the answer.41 
In two other cases, Southeastern Promotions v. Conrad42 and City of 
Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc.,43 the Court assumed that music was 
covered by the First Amendment, but did not independently consider 
whether the musical component of the performances was itself 
expressive. And in neither decision did the Court discuss or distinguish 
Spence’s particularized message standard. 
The closest the Court has come to specifically recognizing 
instrumental music as speech is in its consideration of whether parades 
are constitutionally protected forms of expression in Hurley v. Irish-
American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston.44 Hurley 
involved a successful challenge by organizers of a St. Patrick’s Day 
parade to a state public accommodations law that had been held to 
require them to permit a group of gay, lesbian, and bisexual persons of 
 
 39. Ward, 491 U.S. at 790 (citations omitted). 
 40. Id. Notably, the Ward Court did not even cite the Spence test. 
 41. But see Miller v. Civil City of S. Bend, 904 F.2d 1081, 1096 (7th Cir. 1990) (Posner, J., 
concurring) (inferring that the Ward Court did not mean to limit its holding to music with lyrics), rev’d 
sub nom. Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560 (1991).  
 42. 420 U.S. 546, 547 (1975). In Southeastern Promotions, the Court addressed a prior restraint 
challenge by a theater company whose application to perform the musical Hair at a municipal theater 
was rejected by city officials on the ground that the play would not be “‘in the best interest of the 
community.’” Id. at 548. Although the Court found the city’s actions to be an unconstitutional prior 
restraint, its discussion of live musical drama as speech did not disaggregate the musical components 
from the lyrics sung by the actors in the play. Rather, as it observed, “[b]y its nature, theater usually is 
the acting out—or singing out—of the written word, and frequently mixes speech with live action or 
conduct.” Id. at 557–58 (emphasis added). Thus, the Court’s reference to musical expression was 
limited to its lyrical components. See Schad v. Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 65 (1981) 
(“Entertainment, as well as political and ideological speech, is protected; motion pictures, programs 
broadcast by radio and television, and live entertainment, such as musical and dramatic works, fall 
within the First Amendment guarantee.”). 
 43. 453 U.S. 247, 271 (1981). In Fact Concerts, the Court also assumed without discussion that 
music is covered by the First Amendment. Although presented to the Court on the issue of punitive 
damages, the case essentially involved a concert promoter’s challenge to a city’s cancellation of a 
permit for a performance at a jazz festival on the grounds that the musical group Blood, Sweat and 
Tears was a “rock” group rather than a jazz group. Id. at 250–51. 
 44. 515 U.S. 557, 568–70 (1995). 
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Irish descent to participate in the organizers’ parade.45 The Court’s 
unanimous opinion in support of the parade organizers’ First 
Amendment rights to exclude the gay, lesbian, and bisexual group from 
their parade began with a discussion of the speech value of parades.46 In 
its analysis, the Court rejected the idea that speech must convey a 
“particularized message” to be protected by the First Amendment.47 
Such a restrictive interpretation would have meant, the Court observed, 
that the First Amendment would not “reach the unquestionably shielded 
painting of Jackson Pollock, music of Arnold Schöenberg, or 
Jabberwocky verse of Lewis Carroll.”48 Schöenberg, a modern classical 
composer, created only instrumental musical works.49 Again, however, 
this part of the Court’s decision is a conclusion, not an analysis. 
The lower courts have been equally unedifying. In a recent case, 
Nurre v. Whitehead,50 the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected high 
school students’ claims that school administrators’ actions forbidding 
them from playing an instrumental version of “Ave Maria” violated their 
First Amendment speech rights.51 In cursory fashion, the court declared, 
“It is clear to us that purely instrumental music—i.e., music with no 
lyrics—is speech.”52 In Stratechuk v. Board of Education,53 the Third 
Circuit rejected a similar claim that a public school’s restriction on both 
vocal and instrumental religious musical performances at school-
sponsored programs violated students’ right to receive information and 
ideas and to learn, as well as their right to academic freedom.54 
Stratechuk also failed to specifically address whether the instrumental 
musical performances were covered by the First Amendment.55 
The most thoughtful lower court discussion of music actually 
emerges from a decision about the regulation of nude dancing. In Miller 
v. Civil City of South Bend,56 later reversed by the Supreme Court in 
 
 45. Id. at 561–64. 
 46. Id. at 568–70. 
 47. Id. at 569. 
 48. Id. 
 49. See Rovi Staff, Biography of Arnold Schöenberg, AllMusic, http://www.allmusic.com/artist/ 
arnold-schoenberg-mn0000691043/biography (last visited Feb. 2, 2015). 
 50. 580 F.3d 1087 (9th Cir. 2009). The unsuccessful plaintiffs petitioned the Supreme Court for a 
writ of certiorari, which was denied. Id., cert. denied, 559 U.S. 1025 (2010). But see 559 U.S. 1025 
(2010) (Alito, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari). 
 51. Nurre, 580 F.3d at 1090. 
 52. Id. at 1093. The entirety of Nurre’s analysis involved a citation to the Supreme Court’s 
decisions in Ward and Hurley, as well as a quote from a parenthetical reference to another Ninth 
Circuit case that did nothing but cite Ward as well. Id. 
 53. 587 F.3d 597 (3d Cir. 2009). The plaintiffs also challenged the school’s policies as violating the 
First Amendment’s Establishment Clause. Id. at 599. 
 54. Id. at 599, 610. 
 55. Id. at 609–10. In addition, none of the previous decisions in the case, by either the district 
court or court of appeals, addressed this issue. 
 56. 904 F.2d 1081, 1089 (7th Cir. 1990), rev’d sub nom. Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560 (1991). 
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Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc.,57 several of the circuit judges’ opinions 
commented in dicta on whether music was speech under the First 
Amendment. Sitting en banc, the Seventh Circuit invalidated a city 
ordinance banning public nudity as applied to a commercial 
establishment where concededly non-obscene nude dancing was 
performed for entertainment.58 In doing so, the court rejected the state 
and the dissenters’ arguments distinguishing art from “entertainment,” 
noting, among other things, “not all music appeals to the intellect.”59 
Concurring in the court’s decision, Judge Posner observed that the 
argument that nude dancing is not speech because it does not express 
ideas or opinions could also support the claim that “non-vocal” (that is, 
instrumental) music is not speech.60 Music, he suggested, is covered by 
the First Amendment even when it does not convey a particular message: 
[E]ven if “thought,” “concept,” “idea,” and “opinion” are broadly 
defined, these are not what most music conveys; and even if music is 
regarded as a language, it is not a language for encoding ideas and 
opinions. Insofar as it is more than beautiful sound patterns, music, like 
striptease, organizes, conveys, and arouses emotion, though not sexual 
emotion primarily. If the striptease dancing at the Kitty Kat Lounge is 
not expression, Mozart’s piano concertos and Balanchine’s most 
famous ballets are not expression.61 
He went on to argue that if music must be propositional to count as 
speech, it would mean that most instrumental music would receive less 
protection than nude dancing, and that “Beethoven’s string quartets are 
entitled to less protection than Peter and the Wolf.”62 
In his dissent, Judge Easterbrook agreed that music is a form of art 
that is protected, but that it is completely distinguishable from nude 
dancing in a barroom.63 In his view, music and other art forms are pure 
communication, not conduct that is expressive, like flag burning or a strip 
tease.64 As he observed: 
 
 57. 501 U.S. 560, 565 (1991). 
 58. Miller, 904 F.2d at 1089. 
 59. Id. at 1086 (emphasis added). 
 60. Id. at 1094 (Posner, J., concurring). Judge Posner had made a similar observation, also in 
dicta, in an earlier case. See Reed v. Vill. of Shorewood, 704 F.2d 943, 949–50 (7th Cir. 1983) 
(“Although the authors of the First Amendment were concerned with protecting political rather than 
cultural expression . . . and therefore might not have thought it a violation of the First Amendment for 
Congress to pass a law forbidding the playing of Haydn’s string quartets on federal government lands, 
the modern view is different. If the defendants passed an ordinance forbidding the playing of rock and 
roll music in the Village of Shorewood, they would be infringing a First Amendment right . . . even if 
the music had no political message—even if it had no words—and the defendants would have to 
produce a strong justification for thus repressing a form of ‘speech.’” (emphasis added)). 
 61. Miller, 904 F.2d at 1093 (Posner, J., concurring). 
 62. Id. at 1094. 
 63. Id. at 1125 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting). 
 64. Id. 
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People may fairly dispute whether absolute music, such as LaMonte 
Young’s Well-Tuned Piano, communicates thoughts, but surely it 
embodies them (the right place for the major third, etc.); all that we 
call music is the product of rational human thought and appeals at least 
in part to the same faculties in others. It has the “capacity to appeal to 
the intellect,” . . . is not “conduct,” and is closer to speech (even an 
emotional harangue is speech) than to smashing a Ming vase or kicking 
a cat, two other ways to express emotion.65 
Notwithstanding their fundamental disagreement about the merits of the 
case, Judges Posner and Easterbrook elaborated more carefully about 
the conception of music as speech than any other judicial actors before or 
since.66 
B. The Scholarly Literature 
Academics have also paid surprisingly little attention to the question 
of instrumental music as speech.67 Several excellent scholarly works have 
tried to define the more general boundaries of art as speech, but for the 
most part, they have done so without identifying music as a unique form 
of expression.68 Nonetheless, these commentaries provide an 
indispensable starting point, for there is a degree of overlap between the 
speech value of other art forms and instrumental music. A common 
thread with this work, and one that connects this Article with its 
predecessors, is the agreement that free speech theory and doctrine have 
not adequately addressed the complex issues associated with artistic 
expression.69 
Marci Hamilton and Sheldon Nahmod presented earlier treatments 
of art and speech that provide useful foundations for thinking about 
music. Hamilton argues that art ought to be acknowledged as speech 
specifically because of its subversive possibilities, offering its “singular 
capacity to offer the experience of new worlds and therefore new 
perspectives on the status quo.”70 Thus, art is speech because of its 
unique ability to be subversive, to “defamiliarize” conventionality, and to 
promote what she calls its “instrumental, liberty-reinforcing role in a 
representative democracy.”71 
In contrast, Nahmod argues that it is not fruitful to attempt to derive 
artistic expression’s value through the lens of political speech. Rather, he 
 
 65. Id. 
 66. The Supreme Court’s decision in Barnes, reversing Miller, does not even discuss music. The 
word music appears only once in the entire decision, in a footnote in Justice White’s dissent referring 
to the definition of dancing. Barnes, 501 U.S. 560, 587 n.1 (White, J., dissenting). 
 67. See supra note 3 and accompanying text. 
 68. See supra note 3 and accompanying text. 
 69. See, e.g., Hamilton, supra note 3, at 75–76; Nahmod, supra note 3, at 235. 
 70. Hamilton, supra note 3, at 121. 
 71. Id. at 75. 
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claims that art should be acknowledged as valuable independent of its 
role in political discourse (however broadly defined). Drawing on 
aesthetic theory, and in particular on Plato and Kant, Nahmod suggests 
that art should be independently valued for its ability to promote the 
beautiful and the sublime.72 From his perspective, the flaw in most 
thinking about art and free speech is the notion that art must convey a 
specific message or meaning to fall within the three predominant 
justifications for constitutional protection of expression.73 
An important recent contribution to the discourse on art and the 
First Amendment comes from Mark Tushnet.74 Like me, Tushnet views 
questions about art’s coverage as much more complicated than courts 
and commentators are inclined to recognize. Though art, like music, 
seems like an easy case, there are no easy answers. 
Tushnet makes a number of interesting observations, a couple of 
which I highlight here. First, he rejects, as do I, what he calls the 
“rationality challenge,” which suggests that the question of the First 
Amendment’s coverage of art is not an important one because there will 
rarely be legitimate governmental reasons to suppress art.75 On this view, 
any state regulation of artistic expression would likely be invalidated by a 
substantive due process challenge because the state’s action would not be 
rational.76 As Tushnet points out, however, there sometimes may be 
“legitimate” (though not necessarily compelling) government interests in 
regulating art work, such as when highly offensive artwork is displayed 
publicly.77 
 
 72. Nahmod, supra note 3, at 226–35. 
 73. Id. 
 74. See generally Tushnet, supra note 3. 
 75. Id. at 182–83. 
 76. Id. For a variation on this argument suggesting that art can be classified as speech because of 
the illegitimacy of government motivations for regulating artistic expression, see Frederick Schauer, 
Free Speech: A Philosophical Enquiry 111 (1982) (suggesting that the proper characterization of 
artistic expression is a “false problem” because free speech concerns are implicated any time a 
regulation is “designed to limit the extent to which people will be influenced by a work of art”); Cass 
R. Sunstein, Democracy and the Problem of Freedom of Speech 158 (1993) (claiming that “an effort 
to regulate music because it stirs up passionate feeling would run afoul of the free speech clause, 
simply because the justification for regulation is constitutionally off-limits”). 
 77. Tushnet, supra note 3, at 203. Another possibility would be a situation when the government 
claims the work is so disturbing that it might incite an immediate riot or other unlawful action. See 
Nelson v. Streeter, 16 F.3d 145, 150 (7th Cir. 1994). Government regulation of art is more likely to be 
upheld under a due process challenge, but would be subject to a heightened level of scrutiny if art is 
covered by the First Amendment. In any event, if there is a choice between considering music as 
speech under the First Amendment or a liberty under the Fourteenth Amendment, there is also a 
doctrinal reason to focus on speech. The Supreme Court has articulated a preference for analyzing 
rights under the narrower, more specific provision of the Constitution that might apply rather than 
under due process. See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 394–95 (1989). For cases addressing musical 
expression and some form of due process claim, see Pub. Utils. Comm’n v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451, 454 
(1952) (rejecting passengers’ first amendment and substantive due process claims against public 
utilities commission for playing music in streetcars and buses); id. at 468–69 (Douglas, J., dissenting) 
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To Tushnet’s point, I would add that the rationality challenge is a bit 
of an analytical dodge. It is a sort of legal reverse engineering, working 
backwards from the lack of governmental interest to define something as 
speech, while offering no independent understanding of why speech is 
covered by the First Amendment or bears any value at all. There are 
many government regulations that might lack a plausible justification, 
but that does not make the conduct they regulate speech. Such laws may 
still be unconstitutional because they are arbitrary, but not necessarily 
because the regulated activity is important or valuable. 
Tushnet also makes the case that basing coverage determinations on 
the speaker’s intent (as in Spence) is both over-inclusive—violent 
conduct intended to convey displeasure with the government is not 
covered—and under-inclusive—many artists produce work that is not 
intended to convey a specific message.78 He also suggests that focusing 
on expression that uses words to define First Amendment coverage is not 
particularly helpful because there are clearly ways of communicating an 
identifiable message, even an overt political message, that do not use 
words, and words do not always even convey meaning.79 This insight is, 
of course, essential to thinking about instrumental music, which by 
definition is wordless. 
Ultimately, after identifying many of the difficulties in justifying the 
First Amendment’s coverage of art, Tushnet relies on a type of pragmatic 
reasoning to support the claim. First, he says, we might find art to be 
covered because it bears a “family resemblance” to political speech.80 
Art may not fulfill all of the conditions we typically associate with 
speech, but many types of art meet many of the conditions.81 Second, 
given that much art fits “enough” of these criteria, he embraces a “rules 
versus standards” argument, suggesting that a categorical conclusion that 
all art is covered by the First Amendment is probably superior to a case-
by-case analysis of how each art work might constitute speech, a decision 
that “may well be beyond the capacity of ordinary legal decision makers 
to do . . . reliably across the range of problems they may encounter.”82 
In addition to the general scholarship on art and the First 
Amendment, there has been some academic discussion of government 
 
(arguing that the government’s playing of music was a due process violation because the audience was 
captive and could not change the station); Jenkins v. Rumsfeld, 412 F. Supp. 1177, 1179 (E.D. Va. 
1976) (rejecting claim by military band members that a law prohibiting them from competing with 
local musicians for paid music gigs violated their due process rights). 
 78. Tushnet, supra note 3, at 187–92. 
 79. Id. at 192–99; see also Joseph Blocher, Nonsense and the Freedom of Speech: What Meaning 
Means for the First Amendment, 63 Duke L.J. 1423 (2014). 
 80.  Tushnet, supra note 3, at 219. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. 
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censorship of music because of its lyrical content.83 For example, there 
was considerable deliberation over government attempts in the early 
1990s to forbid the sale of 2 Live Crew’s album, “As Nasty As They 
Wanna Be,” on the ground that it was legally obscene.84 But in that case, 
the court noted that the case appeared to be the first time an appellate 
court had been asked to apply the legal standard for obscenity “to a 
musical composition, which contains both instrumental music and 
lyrics.”85 The lyrical components were clearly the sole basis of the 
obscenity claim.86 Accordingly, the scholarly commentary addressed only 
that question.87 But legal analysis of government censorship of lyrics, 
completely disaggregated from the musical content, ought to be no 
different from evaluating censorship of a book, speech, or leaflet. This is 
not to say that there are not important social concerns about government 
efforts to censor songs, just that they don’t raise interesting conceptual 
questions. Although, to the extent the dispute in this case implicates 
concerns over the racial component of the band’s musical genre, it may 
have some bearing on thinking about music as an expression of cultural 
values, which I discuss below.88 
With regard to analyzing how First Amendment doctrine and theory 
apply to purely instrumental music, the only serious effort of any kind 
thus far has been a student note.89 David Munkittrick’s Note shares my 
concerns about the lack of recognition, from the courts or the academy, 
that instrumental music has not been independently analyzed as a species 
of expression.90 Like me, he draws on some aesthetic theory and 
 
 83. Though sometimes, the distinction between musical and lyrical content may be difficult to 
draw, even for censors. In 1968, an El Paso radio station refused to play Bob Dylan songs because its 
management found it too difficult to understand the lyrics, and were reportedly concerned that the 
songs might include “politically objectionable or lewd messages.” See Meredith E. Rutledge-Borger, 
Rock and Roll vs. Censorship, Rock & Roll Hall of Fame, (Aug. 23, 2013, 9:00 AM), https://rockhall.com/ 
blog/post/8840_censorship-in-rock-and-roll-history. 
 84. See, e.g., Luke Records, Inc. v. Navarro, 960 F.2d 134, 136 (11th Cir. 1992). 
 85. Id. at 135 (emphasis added). 
 86. Id. Interestingly, however, the lower court judge in that case specifically suggested the 
possibility that music without lyrics could be deemed obscene. Skywalker Records, Inc. v. Navarro, 
739 F. Supp. 578, 591 (S.D. Fla. 1990) (“[I]t would be difficult, albeit not impossible, to find that mere 
sound without lyrics is obscene.” (emphasis added)), rev’d sub nom. Luke Records, 960 F.2d 134. 
 87. The majority of commentary on the 2 Live Crew case appears to come from student notes and 
comments. See, e.g., Alexis A. Lury, Note, Time to Surrender: A Call for Understanding and the Re-
Evaluation of Heavy Metal Music Within the Contexts of Legal Liability and Women, 9 S. Cal. Rev. 
L. & Women’s Stud. 155, 178–82 (1999); Kirk A. Olson, Note, Constitutional Law: Can Music Be 
Considered Obscene? Skywalker Records, Inc. v. Navarro—The 2 Live Crew, Obscene or 
Oppressed?, 44 Okla. L. Rev. 513 (1991). 
 88. See infra notes 227–257 and accompanying text. For observations about the role of race in a 
different controversy surrounding 2 Live Crew, see Bezanson, Art and Freedom, supra note 3, at 
184–213 (discussing the copyright dispute regarding the band’s parody of the Roy Orbison song, “Oh, 
Pretty Woman”). 
 89. See generally Munkittrick, supra note 4. 
 90. Id. at 667. 
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approaches from other disciplines and discusses the basic free speech 
theories that might apply.91 As with the scholarly work on artistic 
expression, his piece provides insight and a valuable starting point. This 
Article, however, departs from his in important ways. First, while 
Munkittrick acknowledges that “no single First Amendment theory fully 
explains protection of music as speech,”92 his work places a stronger 
emphasis on the role of music in the democratic order than is warranted. 
Second, this Article more specifically distinguishes and identifies the 
different expressive possibilities of instrumental music, which is a 
necessary predicate to understanding how free speech theory can be 
mapped onto instrumental music. 
This summary is necessarily abbreviated and does not touch on every 
aspect of the prior scholarship. To the extent that past work is helpful in 
thinking about instrumental music, I have integrated it further into the 
discussions in Parts II and III. While I draw on this scholarship to the 
extent that examining coverage of the visual arts indisputably raises 
concerns that overlap with music, this Article argues that the 
consideration of instrumental music as speech has some very different 
implications as well, and that these are worthy of independent analysis. 
C. Instrumental Music Censorship 
A logical, initial reaction to the lack of either serious judicial or 
academic treatment of the question of instrumental music as speech 
might be that it simply doesn’t matter. Beyond a few rare examples, 
music censorship has occurred relatively infrequently in American 
society. To the extent that it has arisen, it has focused on the lyrical, 
rather than musical, component of the expression.93 The need to examine 
the grounds for its protection may therefore not be perceived as urgent. 
But calls for control and regulation of instrumental music have 
spanned millennia and have emerged from all parts of the world, from 
both government entities and other powerful institutions. Plato 
associated certain forms of music with licentiousness and warned about 
the negative impact of music on character.94 In medieval Europe, for 
many years the Catholic Church banned a note known as the tritone, an 
augmented fourth or diminished fifth note in the Western musical scale, 
because its dissonant sound evoked evil.95 The Church even labeled it the 
 
 91. Id. at 674–85. 
 92. Id. at 668. 
 93. See, e.g., Luke Records, Inc. v. Navarro, 960 F.2d 134, 135–36 (11th Cir. 1992). 
 94. See 1 Plato, The Republic bk. IV, at 424 (Benjamin Jowett trans., Oxford University Press 
3d ed. 1908) (c. 380 B.C.E.). 
 95. Finlo Rohrer, The Devil’s Music, BBC News Mag. (Apr. 28, 2006, 3:19 PM), http://news.bbc.co.uk/ 
2/hi/4952646.stm. 
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Devil’s Interval.96 In 1322, Pope John XXII “issued a decree that banned 
the usage of descant (improvised high melodic lines) in church 
services.”97 And in a widely known, though perhaps not completely 
understood, example of “populist censorship” of instrumental work, the 
1913 debut of Stravinsky’s “The Rite of Spring” was met with a hostile 
audience reaction that resulted in a major public disturbance.98 As 
described by one account, “[t]he altercation, which escalated into a riot 
that spilled out into the streets (and featured the rare sight of baton-
wielding gendarmes thumping the heads of uptown arts patrons), was 
reportedly sparked by an audience shocked by the musical piece’s then 
unheard of, and therefore extremely unsettling, rhythms.”99 
In Nazi Germany, Hitler’s regime banned the publication, sale, 
performance, and broadcast of “Entartete Musik” (degenerate music).100 
Through its Reichsmusikkammer (Reich Chamber of Musical Affairs), 
the government systematically excluded Jewish performers and 
composers from nearly all aspects of German musical life.101 Among the 
notable composers whose work was banned by the Nazis as degenerate 
were Stravinsky, Mahler, and Gershwin. Jewish composers, such as 
Mendelssohn, were specifically targeted for censorship as well, as was 
jazz music, quite probably because of its association with African 
Americans.102 The Nazis also engaged in a form of cultural apartheid, 
forbidding the performance of works by Jewish composers, except in the 
context of events sponsored by the Kulturbund (Jewish Cultural 
League), while at the same time forbidding Jews to perform the work of 
non-Jewish German composers.103 Similarly, a long history of music 
censorship marks several periods of the Soviet regime in the twentieth 
century, including, most notably, the regulation of the work of 
Shostakovich.104 The Soviet government censored instrumental music for 
religious, nationalist, and political reasons. It kept close tabs on music for 
fear that it would be decadently bourgeois, class hostile, or religious.105 
Moreover, in contemporary cultures, particularly those with 
sectarian-dominated government regimes, censorship of instrumental 
music is common. Though there is wide disagreement about the role of 
 
 96. Id. 
 97. Peter Blecha, Taboo Tunes: A History of Banned Bands and Censored Songs 15–16 (2004). 
   98. Id. at 16.  
 99. Id. (emphasis added). As some have observed, however, it is not entirely clear whether the 
audience’s reaction was because they were upset about what the music communicated or because they 
did not understand it at all. See Wright, supra note 13, at 1247 n.169. 
 100. Levi, supra note 9, at 86. 
 101. Haas, supra note 9, at 226. 
 102. Levi, supra note 9, at 120; Kozinn, supra note 9. 
 103. Haas, supra note 9, at 231–35. 
 104. Green, supra note 9, at 590; Mirovalev, supra note 9. 
 105. Green, supra note 9, at 590. 
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music in Islam, the previously Taliban-controlled Afghanistan106 and the 
current Iranian government107 banned instrumental music because of its 
association with non-puritanical values and lifestyles and alcohol or drug 
use. Similar sectarian-driven animosity from an Islamist rebel group in 
northern Mali led to the cancellation in 2013 of the Festival au Désert, a 
world famous music celebration.108 As reported by those involved with 
past Festivals, the rebels targeted what they viewed as “Satan’s music” 
including not only Western music but also “local music styles deemed 
offensive to the standards of Shariah, or Islamic law, that were being 
imposed on a traditionally tolerant and multicultural society.”109 Among 
the local genres of music that were censored was music produced by 
tindé drums, usually performed by female ensembles.110 Rebels 
threatened musicians’ lives if they performed and destroyed their 
instruments and equipment.111 
An informal ban on the performance of Wagner’s work persisted for 
decades in Israel as well.112 The ban was widely embraced based on 
claims of Wagner’s anti-Semitism and his association with the Nazi 
regime, though that regime arose well after his death.113 For many Israeli 
Jews, Wagner’s compositions bore strong associations with the 
Holocaust.114 
While less widespread or frequent, several examples of 
governmental or other institutional restrictions on the musical 
component of expression exist even in the United States. In just the past 
few years, two public school districts have been sued, albeit 
unsuccessfully, for restricting purely instrumental musical performances 
at school programs and ceremonies because of the music’s religious 
affiliations.115 In Nurre116 student musicians claimed, among other things, 
that the school’s ban on their selected performance violated their free 
speech rights.117 They had chosen to play an instrumental version of 
Franz Biebl’s “Ave Maria” because “they believed [it] showcased their 
talent and the culmination of their instrumental work.”118 Nonetheless, 
 
 106. See supra note 10 and accompanying text. 
 107. Tait, supra note 10. 
 108. Larry Rohter, Musical Nomads, Escaping Political Upheaval, N.Y. Times, July 30, 2013, at C1. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Munkittrick, supra note 4, at 673–74. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Stratechuk v. Bd. of Educ., 587 F.3d 597, 610 (3d Cir. 2009); Nurre v. Whitehead, 580 F.3d 
1087, 1090 (9th Cir. 2009). 
 116. Nurre, 580 F.3d 1087. 
 117. Id. at 1091. 
 118. Id. 
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fearing that the school district would receive complaints about the 
religious content of the music, and wanting to appear neutral toward 
religion for both Establishment Clause and political purposes, officials 
banned the performance, an action upheld by the Ninth Circuit.119 In a 
similar case, Stratechuk,120 the Third Circuit upheld a ban on the 
performance of holiday music with religious themes, including 
instrumental works, at school programs.121 
Other examples dot the constitutional landscape as well. A 
successful federal obscenity prosecution in the 1960s targeted two 
phonograph records, one of which, according to one Supreme Court 
Justice, contained material that was made up “almost entirely of the 
sounds of percussion instruments”122 (perhaps the first documented 
historical ban on aural sex). 
Nongovernmental institutions that control forums for musical 
expression have also played a censoring role. For example, in 1959, 
federally licensed American radio stations refused to broadcast the 
purely instrumental Link Wray song, “Rumble,” based on its title’s 
association with street violence.123 The BBC banned the broadcast of the 
instrumental theme song from the Frank Sinatra movie, The Man with 
the Golden Arm, because of its connection to a film about drug abuse.124 
And a major retail chain in the Pacific Northwest affixed an “explicit 
lyrics” warning label similar to the type sponsored by the RIAA to all 
copies of the Frank Zappa album, Jazz from Hell, even though the album 
was comprised entirely of instrumental music.125 
These instances of instrumental music censorship naturally lead to 
important questions about what exactly is being censored. This inquiry, 
in turn, leads to a critical examination about the communicative meaning 
of instrumental music, which is addressed in Part III. 
II.  The Uneasy Fit Between Instrumental Music and  
Free Speech Doctrine and Theory 
Despite the general assumption that instrumental music is 
constitutionally protected speech, important and unanswered questions 
 
 119. Id. 
 120. 587 F.3d 597 (3d Cir. 2009). 
 121. Id. at 610. The plaintiffs challenged the school’s policies as violating both the free speech 
clause and Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. 
 122. United States v. Davis, 353 F.2d 614 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 953 (1966) (Stewart, 
J., dissenting from denial of certiorari). Apparently, Justice Stewart knew it when he heard it (or 
didn’t). Cf. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring) (articulating Justice 
Stewart’s well known struggle to define hard-core pornography by the subjective factor “I know it 
when I see it”). 
 123. Bernstein, supra note 7. 
 124. Horsfield, supra note 7. 
 125. Nuzum, supra note 7, at 254–55. 
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remain. As this Part will discuss, the dominant utilitarian theories of free 
speech, which justify protection based on the goal of promoting 
democratic self-governance and facilitating the search for “truth” by 
ensuring a free marketplace of all ideas (not just political ones), do not 
adequately explain constitutional protection for music, except at the 
broadest levels of abstraction. A partial explanation may emerge under 
the truth-seeking theory, however, if music is understood as advancing 
non-ideational aspects of truth. Free speech theory based on promoting 
dignitary interests, such as individual self-realization and autonomy, offer 
a much better match, but make it difficult to distinguish music from other 
forms of human liberty protected by the Constitution. 
As a quick disclaimer, I should say that my aim here is not to 
embrace one free speech theory over another or argue that one is superior 
as a unifying principle than the others. Rather, my less ambitious goal, 
accepting that each of these theories provides a plausible theoretical 
foundation for protecting speech,126 is to examine how well any of these 
justifications support the conclusion that instrumental music is and ought 
to be constitutionally protected.127 
A. Promoting Democratic Self-Governance 
Perhaps the most widely discussed and accepted theory underlying 
the constitutional protection of speech identifies freedom of expression 
as a means of promoting a healthy, transparent, and effective democratic 
system of governance. Earlier scholarly proponents of this theory include 
Alexander Meiklejohn, whose work argued that the First Amendment is 
designed, 
to give to every voting member of the body politic the fullest possible 
participation in the understanding of those problems with which the 
citizens of a self-governing society must deal . . . The primary purpose 
of the First Amendment is, then, that all the citizens shall, so far as 
possible, understand the issues which bear upon our common life.128 
In its original iteration, consistent with his emphasis on promoting 
democracy, Meiklejohn’s speech theory distinguished between public 
discourse, which he viewed as protected by the First Amendment, and 
private communication, which he deemed as governed by the Due 
Process Clause.129 Meiklejohn’s narrow focus on democratic self-rule was 
 
 126. These are not the only theories of free speech, but they are the most commonly invoked by 
both legal scholars and the courts. For a brief discussion of some other speech theories, see Geoffrey 
R. Stone et al., Constitutional Law 1026–27 (6th ed. 2009). 
 127. Not all legal theorists agree that utilitarian, “constructivist,” or consequentialist approaches 
are useful to understanding free speech. See, e.g., Larry Alexander, Is There a Right of Freedom of 
Expression? 127–34 (2005); Andrew Koppelman, Veil of Ignorance: Tunnel Constructivism in Free 
Speech Theory, 107 Nw. U. L. Rev. 647 (2013). 
 128. Alexander Meiklejohn, Free Speech and Its Relation to Self-Government 88–89 (1948). 
 129. Id. at 94. 
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criticized by, among others, Zechariah Chafee, who pointed out that 
Meiklejohn’s theory meant that the First Amendment did not protect 
“art and literature.”130 Chafee found it “shocking to deprive these vital 
matters” of protection under the speech clause.131 
Meiklejohn’s rejoinder to this criticism required him to rethink his 
original position on artistic expression under the First Amendment. In 
later work, he took the view that literature and “the arts” fell within the 
First Amendment’s protection because they were included within the 
forms of communication “from which the voter derives the knowledge, 
intelligence, sensitivity to human values: the capacity for sane and 
objective judgment which, so far as possible, a ballot should express.”132 
Elaborating on this, he observed that literature and the arts “are protected 
because they have a ‘social importance’ which [he] called a ‘governing’ 
importance.”133 But Meiklejohn does not mention music in particular, 
and it is unclear from his conclusions about the arts whether he would view 
nonverbal artistic expression, such as instrumental music, as advancing 
these same values. Indeed, the examples he gave involve verbal media, 
such as novels, which can be much more directly connected to 
democracy.134 
In later work, Robert Bork took a much narrower view of speech 
and democracy more in line with Meiklejohn’s earlier work. He 
concluded that “[c]onstitutional protection should be accorded only to 
speech that is explicitly political.”135 “There is no basis,” he explained, 
“for judicial intervention to protect any other form of expression, be it 
scientific, literary or that variety of expression we call obscene or 
pornographic.”136 For Bork, this boundary was essential to ensuring that 
First Amendment law advances the principal objective of “‘the discovery 
and spread of political truth.’”137 But he rejected the idea that artistic 
expression facilitated democratic goals. 
I agree that there is an analogy between criticism of official behavior 
and the publication of a novel like Ulysses, for the latter may form 
attitudes that ultimately affect politics. But it is an analogy, not an 
identity. Other human activities and experiences also form personality, 
teach and create attitudes just as much as does the novel, but no one 
 
 130. Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Book Review, 62 Harv. L. Rev. 891, 900 (1949). 
 131. Id. 
 132. See Alexander Meiklejohn, The First Amendment Is an Absolute, 1961 Sup. Ct. Rev. 245, 
256; see also Harry Kalven, The New York Times Case: A Note on “The Central Meaning of the First 
Amendment”, 1964 Sup. Ct. Rev. 191, 221. 
 133. Meiklejohn, supra note 132, at 262. 
 134. Professor Hamilton’s work adheres to the notion that art is expression because, in its own 
way, it promotes democracy, and in this way, importantly elaborates on Meiklejohn’s arguably 
boundless extension of his democracy-facilitating theory. See generally Hamilton, supra note 3. 
 135. Bork, supra note 11, at 20. 
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. at 24 (citing Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring)). 
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would on that account, I take it, suggest that the [F]irst [A]mendment 
strikes down regulations of economic activity, control of entry into a 
trade, laws about sexual behavior, marriage and the like. Yet these 
activities, in their capacity to create attitudes that ultimately impinge 
upon the political process, are more like literature and science than 
literature and science are like political speech.138 
Even more advanced forms of democratic theory arguably do not do 
the work necessary to support a strong claim for protecting instrumental 
music. Contemporary theorists embrace the self-governance promoting 
foundations of the First Amendment, but like Meiklejohn struggle with 
the dilemma that this theory presents for artistic expression. Robert Post 
argues for a broader understanding of the democratic self-governance 
theory that ensures not simply informed decisionmaking about 
candidates and issues, but also protects the process of forming public 
opinion, “which is understood as a form of communicative action.”139 His 
theory calls for the protection not of speech per se, but of “those speech 
acts and media of communication that are socially regarded as necessary 
and proper means of participating in the formation of public opinion,” 
which Post calls “public discourse.”140 “The function of public discourse 
is to enable persons to experience the value of self-government.”141 
According to Post, self-governance theory is properly understood in 
relation to its protection of individual autonomy and self-determination 
in the formation of opinion related to the democratic process.142 
Post claims that his theory is capacious enough to include protection 
for artistic expression. He writes: 
Public discourse includes all communicative processes deemed 
necessary for the formation of public opinion. Art and other forms of 
noncognitive, nonpolitical speech fit comfortably within the scope of 
public discourse. Public discourse depends upon the maintenance of a 
public sphere, which is a sociological structure that is a prerequisite to 
the formation of public opinion.143 
Even with his broad understanding of public opinion, however, it is not 
obvious how instrumental musical expression is “necessary” to its 
understanding. Said differently, Post suggests that to be subject to the 
First Amendment’s coverage, artistic expression “need not concern 
potential policy decisions; it need only contribute to what people think 
when they communicate to each other in public.”144 Perhaps what he is 
 
 138. Id. at 27. 
 139. Robert Post, Participatory Democracy and Free Speech, 97 Va. L. Rev. 477, 483 (2011). 
 140. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).  
 141. Id. 
 142. Id.  
 143. Id. at 486.  
 144. Robert Post, Participatory Democracy as a Theory of Free Speech: A Reply, 97 Va. L. Rev. 
617, 621 (2011). 
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suggesting is that art must be protected because to fail to do so would 
undermine the very legitimacy of democratic governance; but that would 
seem to be true of many other forms of communication, not all of which 
are protected. And it is not at all clear why music or other forms of 
nonpropositional expression would contribute to what people “think” 
when they communicate to each other in public, or how that contributes 
to the public discourse, even broadly defined.145 
James Weinstein, who also argues for a democracy-promoting First 
Amendment theory, is more skeptical about the conceptual connection 
between purely instrumental music and promotion of self-governance. 
As he observes, “[p]erhaps its greatest explanatory shortcoming is that a 
theory based in participatory democracy cannot easily explain the 
rigorous protection that current doctrine affords non-ideational art such 
as abstract paintings or symphonic music.”146 Though Weinstein 
acknowledges the “plausible” democracy-based explanation that “art in 
general can be a particularly effective means of political persuasion,”147 
that is not always the case, or even the intention, of musical expression, 
and I share his doubt that this adequately explains the rigorous First 
Amendment protection that artistic speech presumptively enjoys. 
Similarly, as Seana Shiffrin aptly observes: 
Although a case could be made that the freedom to compose and to 
listen to Stravinsky is important to developing the sort of open 
personal and cultural character necessary for democracy to flourish or 
that it feeds the “sociological structure that is prerequisite for the 
formation of public opinion,” that justification is strained and bizarrely 
indirect. In any case, the right of Stravinsky to compose and of 
audiences to listen (or to cringe in non-comprehension) should not 
depend upon whether The Rite of Spring breeds democrats or fascists, 
or whether it supports, detracts from, or is superfluous to a democratic 
culture.148 
As suggested earlier, Munkittrick’s commentary on music and 
speech relies heavily, though not exclusively, on a democracy-based 
rationale. On this ground, he argues that the government actually plays a 
necessary role in promoting musical expression to sustain “a minimum 
level of diversity in the aesthetic, creative, and emotional decision 
making that music enables.”149 He goes on to argue that such diversity is 
 
 145. See Koppelman, supra note 127, at 679 (“Democratic legitimation . . . cannot explain the 
protection of instrumental music.”); see also Wright, supra note 13, at 1222 (observing that not all 
instrumental music expresses an opinion or has a subject). 
 146. Weinstein, supra note 12, at 499 n.45. 
 147. Id. 
 148. Seana Valentine Shiffrin, A Thinker-Based Approach to Freedom of Speech, 27 Const. 
Comment. 283, 285–86 (2011) (emphasis added) (citation omitted); See C. Edwin Baker, Autonomy and 
Free Speech, 27 Const. Comment. 251, 271 (2011) (“[C]ompositional music . . . require[s] a stretch to 
justify as political speech.”). 
 149. Munkittrick, supra note 4, at 682–83. 
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essential to ensuring that the democratic functions of music are not 
impaired.150 In advancing this view, he suggests that instrumental music is 
central to political life.151 But the examples he draws on to illustrate that 
music can act as “direct political speech” do not involve pure musical 
expression, but the appropriation of music for its performers’ specific 
goals.152 That is, his arguments are premised more on the association of 
music with particular events or historical contexts, not on the inherent 
expressive function of the music itself. As I argue below, however, 
associative claims are not really about the music; they are derivative of 
the contexts in which the music is placed, and therefore do not support a 
democratic justification for counting music as speech.153 
Democratic self-governance theory is typically operationalized, 
however imperfectly, through doctrinal devices, primarily the Court’s 
articulation of a heavy presumption against regulations that discriminate 
based on the viewpoint or content of speech.154 Even if we are to accept 
the democracy-promoting value of musical expression, it is difficult to 
imagine how this doctrine would be implemented to evaluate the 
constitutionality of music regulation. What would the application of 
viewpoint or content discrimination look like? It is doubtful whether 
instrumental music, unlike music with lyrics, can ever be said to have a 
specific viewpoint.155 Even if it could, it would not likely be a political 
viewpoint or one that would contribute, directly or indirectly, to the 
flourishing of democracy. This is why Meiklejohn and others have 
struggled to defend artistic expression under the democratic theory. That 
is not to say that governments have not attempted to censor instrumental 
music because of its political associations, or rather because of their 
perceptions of its political meaning. But it would be an odd application 
of First Amendment doctrine, though perhaps not an entirely 
inappropriate one, if courts applied strict scrutiny to government 
suppression of music because of its perceived political content or 
viewpoint where the composer or performer had no such intent. 
An easier case can be made that different types of instrumental 
music bear different content, and that the government might discriminate 
based on that content. Content discrimination might come in the form of 
discrimination against particular genres of music (classical music is ok, 
rap and hip-hop are not) or matters of taste (allowing performance of only 
“good” or “artistic” music, but not bad music). Indeed, the Fact Concerts 
 
 150. Id. at 683. 
 151. Id. 
 152. Id. at 683–84. 
 153. See infra notes 195–209 and accompanying text. 
 154. But see Baker, supra note 148, at 278–80 (arguing that the content discrimination doctrine 
actually reflects the Court’s invocation of an autonomy-based rationale). 
 155. Greenman, supra note 13, at 1348; Munkittrick, supra note 4, at 676–77. 
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case is an example of precisely that type of genre discrimination.156 But 
again, the implications for democratic self-rule in protecting speech from 
such restrictions are unclear. The hypothetical regulations here might be 
viewed as matters of taste, but participation in public discourse has never 
turned on whether one’s musical taste is elegant or tacky. Without taking 
a broad view of democracy that encompasses all forms of thought or 
feeling about all subjects, it is difficult to justify protection of 
instrumental music under this theory. 
In the end, democratic self-governance is at best an incomplete 
theory for protecting instrumental music, and at worst simply unhelpful. 
That is not to say that democracy-based speech theory is not one of the 
justifications for constitutional protection of speech. But this Article 
argues that promoting democracy is a conditionally sufficient,157 but not 
necessary, reason for protecting different forms of expression. 
B. Facilitating the Search for Truth 
A second dominant theory for protecting speech is the idea that 
expressive freedom promotes the search for more general truths beyond 
the world of politics and governing. Derived from the writings of John 
Milton and John Stuart Mill, this justification is premised on the 
conception of a broader understanding of truth than is democratic self-
governance theory. Most important, their conceptions of truth are about 
the truth of ideas, not historical or factual truth. Thus, Milton argued that 
freedom in the communication of ideas was essential to promote 
“discovery” of ideas that might be developed in “religious and civil 
wisdom.”158 Similarly, Mill claimed that protection of opinion was crucial 
to liberty because whether the ideas expressed in an opinion are “true” 
or “false,” widely held or marginal, society can only understand truth by 
a full consideration of all opinions.159 Neither Milton nor Mill, however, 
limited the consideration of ideas and opinions to those directly 
grounded in democracy. 
Facilitation of the search for truth is most frequently associated with 
Justice Holmes’s dissent in Abrams v. United States, in which the Court 
upheld the defendants’ convictions under the Espionage Act for 
conspiring to “unlawfully utter, print, write and publish,” among other 
things, “disloyal, scurrilous and abusive language about the form of 
government of the United States” and language intended to bring that 
 
 156. City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 250–51 (1981) (examining city’s cancellation 
of permit to perform because the scheduled band was a rock group rather than a jazz group). 
 157. What I mean by “conditionally sufficient” is that expression ought to be protected because it 
facilitates self-governance, but that not all expression is protected because it is political, for example 
politically motivated property destruction or violence. 
 158. John Milton, Areopagitica 4 (1644). 
 159. John Stuart Mill, On Liberty 82–83 (2d ed. 1859). 
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form of government into “contempt, scorn, contumely, and disrepute.”160 
As he wrote, “the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get 
itself accepted in the competition of the market.”161 Of course, the search 
for truth substantially overlaps with the promotion of self-governance.162 
However, it has been widely conceived as understanding truth in a more 
general sense of social enlightenment that is not limited to opinions 
about government or public policy. 
What types of truths might be generated by free speech that are not 
at least somewhat linked to self-governance, or at least are not inherently 
linked to democracy? Certainly religious or spiritual truths, to the extent 
they inform personal and collective understandings of the universe, 
might fall within this category. In addition, matters of science or morality 
may fall within a broad understanding of areas in which unregulated 
discourse is important to produce a better truth through the evolution of 
ideas. And, as I argue later, cultural truths ought to be included as well. 
The logical progression to conclude that instrumental music is a part 
of this discourse, however, is still somewhat difficult to navigate. Even 
these nonpolitical, non-democracy-facilitating areas of inquiry are 
typically engaged in through propositional verbal expression that appeals 
to cognitive reasoning. Governmental interference with nonverbal 
musical expression distorts the marketplace of ideas only if instrumental 
music conveys or is understood as an idea. But others observe, 
convincingly, that musical expressions are not part of “ideational” or 
ideaist way of communicating. Under truth-based theories, the First 
Amendment might not apply to forms of expression that do not serve to 
protect the communication and reception of information and ideas. As 
John Greenman observes: 
[W]e can say that “information” is used to refer to things like 
sentences, mathematical formulas, musical scores, computer code, and 
DNA strings. But it is not used to refer to things like the sound of 
music or the way a picture looks. “Idea,” on the other hand, refers to 
mostly the same things—sentences, formulas, scores, and so forth—
with the added requirement that “idea” usually connotes a mental 
phenomenon.163 
Edwin Baker similarly suggests that: 
[A]ll aesthetic experiences, like all experiences generally, can affect 
who a person is, how she sees the world, and thereby affect her values, 
politics, and notions of truth. Such explanations for their relevance to 
the political sphere or to a marketplace of ideas do not, however, 
 
 160. 250 U.S. 616, 616–17 (1919). 
 161. Id. at 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
 162. See Eugene Volokh, In Defense of the Marketplace of Ideas/Search for Truth as a Theory of 
Free Speech Protection, 97 Va. L. Rev. 595, 595 (2011). 
 163. Greenman, supra note 13, at 1348 (emphasis added); see also Weinstein, supra note 12, at 499 
n.45 (describing symphonic music as non-ideational art). 
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distinguish them from, say, hiking in a wilderness area, cooperation in 
a barn raising, or engaging in a criminal enterprise.164 
As with the democratic self-governance theory, the search for truth is 
implemented through general doctrinal rules forbidding viewpoint and 
other content discrimination. The rationale for prohibiting such 
discrimination is the prevention of government distortion of the 
marketplace. Because truth finding is a function of complete and open 
discourse, any state interference with the landscape of opinion 
jeopardizes the search for truth.165 To the extent that the market is one of 
ideas, information, opinion, or other appeals to cognitive reasoning (even 
if the objective is not factual truth or political truth, but something moral, 
scientific, literary, and even spiritual), government regulation of 
instrumental music would not appear to affect the search for truth in any 
meaningful way. If that is the case, the truth rationale, without more, is 
not an adequate explanation for the protection of music as speech. A 
more complete understanding of how instrumental music may advance 
certain kinds of truths, however, may cause us to reevaluate this skepticism. 
C. Promoting Individual Autonomy and Self-Fulfillment 
A third compelling claim for protecting speech is grounded in 
promoting individual autonomy. Many scholars have articulated the 
autonomy justifications for freedom of expression, though with varied 
approaches to defining autonomy. Scanlon examines the notion of 
autonomy in terms of the individual’s freedom to engage in self-
determination.166 State interference with the ability to experience the 
universe of competing ideas seriously compromises such autonomy. As 
he famously wrote: 
An autonomous person cannot accept without independent 
consideration the judgment of others as to what he should believe or 
what he should do. He may rely on the judgment of others, but when 
he does so he must be prepared to advance independent reasons for 
thinking their judgment likely to be correct, and to weigh the evidential 
value of their opinion against contrary evidence.167 
A regime under which the government could regulate the free 
conveyance of such opinions or judgments, therefore, is inconsistent with 
each person’s autonomy to form beliefs about her course of thought or 
 
 164. Baker, supra note 148, at 271–72. 
 165. This is, of course, setting aside the many legitimate concerns about whether the speech 
marketplace, any more than the economic marketplace, is completely competitive and that all 
participants have equal resources and information. See generally Sunstein, supra note 76. 
 166. Thomas Scanlon, A Theory of Freedom of Expression, 1 Phil. & Pub. Aff. 204, 216 (1972) 
[hereinafter Scanlon, Theory]. In later work, Scanlon modified his views about speech and autonomy. 
See generally T.M. Scanlon, Jr., Freedom of Expression and Categories of Expression, 40 U. Pitt. L. 
Rev. 519 (1979). 
 167. Scanlon, Theory, supra note 166, at 216. 
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action. An important distinction of this version of the autonomy theory, 
then, is that it emphasizes the value of speech to the individual as much 
as to the collective interest in a functioning democracy or the societal 
achievement of truth. 
Martin Redish argues for a broader, refined version of this theory, 
suggesting that the free speech clause serves the value of “individual self-
realization.”168 In elaborating on this idea, he explains that self-realization, 
can be interpreted to refer either to development of the individual’s 
powers and abilities—an individual ‘realizes’ his or her full potential—
or to the individual’s control of his or her own destiny through making 
life-affecting decisions—an individual ‘realizes’ the goals in life that he 
or she has set.169 
Redish claims that his theory constitutes a stronger approach to speech 
protection in part because the objectives of other theories (promoting 
democracy, the search for truth) are largely subsumed within the promotion 
of self-realization. 
Baker spent much of his life examining and refining autonomy-
based theories of free speech.170 In his later work, he grounded his 
autonomy theory in the concept of legitimacy. He argues that “a legitimate 
legal order must fully respect (among other things, e.g. equality) both 
individual and collective autonomy—both non-political and political 
speech.”171 He elaborates: 
If the moral value of democracy lies (in part) in its contribution to 
people’s political autonomy in pursuit of their democratically chosen 
projects—with its implicit premise that it values these people as 
autonomous—democracy’s authority should be limited by this same 
value. Given this value, democracy (or law) should not, therefore, be 
authorized to enact laws that disrespect, that are premised on the 
propriety of denying, a person’s autonomy (or, though less relevant 
here, her equality and maybe her dignity). This conclusion should then 
guide interpretation of the constitutional guarantee of free speech. It 
gives equal status to protecting speech as a part of personal, individual 
self-government and as an aspect of her participation in collective self-
government.172 
Critics of Baker and other autonomy theorists have made several 
claims. Among them is the concern that autonomy is a justification not 
only for expressive freedom but also for myriad other types of individual 
liberty that are clearly not constitutionally protected. As Bork observed, 
[D]evelopment of individual faculties and the achievement of 
pleasure . . . do not distinguish speech from any other human activity. 
 
 168. Martin H. Redish, The Value of Free Speech, 130 U. Pa. L. Rev. 591, 593 (1982) (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  
 169. Id. 
 170. See generally C. Edwin Baker, Human Liberty and Freedom of Speech (1992). 
 171. Baker, supra note 148, at 266. 
 172. Id. at 266–67. 
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An individual may develop his faculties or derive pleasure from trading 
on the stock market, following his profession as a river port pilot, 
working as a barmaid, engaging in sexual activity, playing tennis, 
rigging prices or in any of thousands of other endeavors.173 
Essentially, this critique suggests that autonomy-based justifications have 
no limiting principle. But as Baker and others point out, of course, one 
limiting principle is the First Amendment, which specifically establishes 
an expression-specific form of liberty, distinctive of other liberties, protected 
and not.174 While many other acts may lead to self-realization or fulfillment, 
they are mostly not expressive or communicative, and are covered, if at all, 
by other aspects of the Constitution.175 
Shiffrin more recently has articulated a “thinker-based” approach to 
autonomy and speech. In developing her theory, she identifies eight 
separate, sometimes overlapping, interests in which the rational thinker 
should enjoy autonomy: capacity for practical and theoretical thought; 
apprehending the true; exercising the imagination; becoming a distinct 
individual; moral agency; responding authentically; living among others; 
and appropriate recognition and treatment.176 As she notes, “[s]peech, 
and free speech in particular, are necessary conditions of the realization 
of these interests.”177 Her version of an autonomy theory suggests that 
each of these values is appropriately advanced by a free speech doctrine, 
and explains how they can be used to justify speech that does not fall 
comfortably under the umbrella of the promotion of democracy or the 
search for truth: 
Communication of the contents of one’s mind primarily through 
linguistic means, but also through pictorial or even musical 
representation, uniquely furthers the interest in being known by others. 
It thereby also makes possible complex forms of social life. Further, it 
helps to develop some of the capacities prerequisite to moral agency 
because successful communication demands having a sense of what 
others are in a position to know and understand. Practicing 
 
 173. Bork, supra note 11, at 25; see also Tushnet, supra note 3, at 205–06 (“Autonomy-related 
theories are . . . problematic as a way to distinguish artistic expression from essentially all other human 
activities, which can be ways in which people live autonomously.”). 
 174. Baker, supra note 148, at 256–57; Redish, supra note 168, at 600 (“[T]hat the framers deemed 
it necessary to create a first amendment at all, rather than merely including speech within the other 
forms of liberty protected by the fifth amendment, indicates that speech is to receive a constitutional 
status above and beyond that given to conduct.”). 
 175. There are easier and harder cases that fall within this group, however. Sexual conduct may be 
a tougher example to distinguish, since sex can have an important expressive component. See 
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 567 (2003); cf. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 568 (1969) (finding, 
under an autonomy theory, that the private observation of legally obscene material in one’s home was 
protected by the First Amendment). 
 176. Shiffrin, supra note 148, at 289–90. 
 177. Id. at 291. 
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communication initiates the process of taking others’ perspective to 
understand what others know and are in a position to grasp.178 
She adds: 
Pictorial representations and music (and not merely discourse about 
them) should also gain foundational protection because they also 
represent the externalization of mental contents, contents that may not 
be accurately or well-captured through linguistic means; after all, not 
all thoughts are discursive or may be fully captured through discursive 
description.179 
The Supreme Court has forcefully, though rarely, based free speech 
claims on autonomy arguments. Perhaps the clearest example of this is in 
Stanley v. Georgia.180 In Stanley, the Court overturned the conviction of 
a man who was charged with possession of obscene films in the privacy of 
his own home.181 The Court embraced the defendant’s First Amendment 
claim that he had the right to determine what material he watched, even 
if that material could otherwise be regulated, or even prohibited.182 In his 
opinion for the Court, Justice Marshall wrote: 
If the First Amendment means anything, it means that a State has no 
business telling a man, sitting alone in his own house, what books he 
may read or what films he may watch. Our whole constitutional 
heritage rebels at the thought of giving government the power to 
control men’s minds.183 
Similarly, it is possible to conceptualize a First Amendment analysis of 
instrumental music under an autonomy-based theory. 
Indeed, like Baker, Redish, and Shiffrin, I agree that some form of 
autonomy justification is one of the strongest theoretical foundations for 
constitutional protection of instrumental music. Shiffrin, in particular, 
articulates a position that broadens the scope of autonomy in ways that 
could be used to justify protection of instrumental music, while still 
maintaining some limiting, if not completely defined, principles that 
would not result in arguments to protect everything as expression. But 
there are some unanswered questions that require further elaboration. 
First, no one has closely examined what it is about instrumental music 
that advances autonomy values. In Part III, this Article breaks musical 
expression down into its constituent parts and discusses what makes 
them distinctly expressive in manners that should be of concern to the 
First Amendment. Second, music could be said to advance all of the 
theories of free speech if taken at their broadest level of abstraction. If 
 
 178. Id. at 291–92. 
 179. Id. at 295. 
 180. 394 U.S. 557 (1969). 
 181. Id. at 568. 
 182. Id. 
 183. Id. at 565. 
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music is protected, what limiting principles exist to distinguish it from other 
forms of expressive liberty that might not advance those same values? 
III.  Understanding Instrumental Music as Speech 
If instrumental music can be justified under any of the three 
dominant theories of free speech protection, its value to the speaker, the 
audience, and the collective society must be measured in relation to 
those theories. As with all forms of communication, music can be 
assessed from the perspective of the speaker (in this case, the composer 
and the performer) as well as from the perspective of its audience (for 
music, its listeners). For the composer and performer, music must be 
understood in terms of its expressive meaning. The value to the listener, 
in turn, includes how she thinks about and interprets the music and how 
it affects her thoughts and emotions—in short, how the listener 
experiences music. Each of these values, in turn, may be influenced by 
the distinct melodic and rhythmic elements of musical expression. 
A. What Is Distinctive About Instrumental Musical  Expression? 
A working definition of music is an important starting point. All 
musical instruments convey sound by creating vibrations that are 
transmitted through the air and internally processed by listeners’ 
eardrums.184 But of course all sound is processed this way, whether it is 
verbal language, music, or a thunder clap. It seems that every generation 
stereotypically views the next generation’s popular music as so much 
noise. So, what are the distinctive factors that make something music and 
not noise?185 The Oxford English Dictionary definition of music is “[t]he 
art or science of combining vocal or instrumental sounds with a view to 
beauty or coherence of form and expression of emotion.”186 The formal 
definition is therefore based on some kind of intentionality to make 
sounds in a manner designed to do more than make noise. But it also, 
importantly, envisions aesthetic values of beauty and emotion.187 
 
 184. See Miller v. Civil City of S. Bend, 904 F.2d 1081, 1125–26 (7th Cir. 1990) (Easterbrook, J., 
dissenting) (“All music is rhythmic pressure on the eardrum. Mozart’s string quartets, jackhammers, 
and humpback whales all produce rhythmic compressions.”), rev’d sub nom. Barnes v. Glen Theatre, 
Inc., 501 U.S. 560 (1991). 
 185. Indeed, the freedom from sound or noise can also promote important values of autonomy. 
See generally Tamara R. Piety, Brandishing the First Amendment: Commercial Expression in 
America (2012); George Prochnik, Op-Ed., I’m Thinking. Please. Be Quiet., N.Y. Times, Aug. 25, 
2013, at 4. 
 186. Shorter Oxford English Dictionary on Historical Principles 1866 (William R. Trumble 
et al. eds., 5th ed. 2002). 
 187. I will set aside, for now, questions about whether there are important differences between 
popular music and music as a fine art because they are not germane to my main discussion. 
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1. Expressing the Inexpressible 
One possible dilemma in defining the speech value of instrumental 
music is that it is sometimes said to be capable of conveying expression in 
a manner that may not be achievable through language (as the Huxley 
quote in the epigraph in the Introduction suggests). Indeed, as John 
Dewey aptly observed: 
If all meanings could be adequately expressed by words, the arts of 
painting and music would not exist. There are values and meanings 
that can be expressed only by immediately visible and audible qualities, 
and to ask what they mean in the sense of something that can be put 
into words is to deny their distinctive existence.188 
Similarly, in his critique of the notion that only speech that conveys 
information or ideas ought to be protected by the First Amendment, 
Greenman writes “[i]f instrumental music conveys ideas, then more or 
less everything must.”189 The challenge is whether these descriptions 
prove too much. That is, if music expresses something that cannot be 
reduced to language, then why, if at all, ought it be protected by the 
freedom of speech? This is one of the questions I explore below. 
2. Music Compared to Other Arts 
A different, but also reasonable, preliminary question is whether 
instrumental music is any different from other forms of nonverbal art, 
such as painting, sculpture, or dancing.190 There are certainly similarities 
that bear mention. First, in the case of instrumental music as well as 
painting and sculpture, the composer, painter, or sculptor may have the 
intent to communicate a specific idea, emotion, or concept, or she may 
have no intent at all except to create something beautiful, interesting, or 
entertaining, and thereby worth looking at or listening to. 
Another similarity is that in the case of all three arts, the expression 
may be open to multiple, varying, and even conflicting interpretations by 
the audience. This, too, presents something of a challenge for fitting 
them into speech theory because if there is not an objective, or at least 
widely understood, meaning attributable to the expression, it is hard to 
figure out how it can be classified as speech under the standard doctrine. 
For example, if there is no accepted understanding of the message or 
idea expressed in an artistic work, how would we know when the 
government was engaging in content or viewpoint discrimination? 
 
 188. John Dewey, Art as Experience 74 (1934). 
 189. Greenman, supra note 13, at 1348. 
 190. I set aside verbal forms of artistic expression such as literature and poetry for the same 
reasons that I do not address musical lyrics. 
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An important factor that sets instrumental music apart from 
painting or sculpture, however, is that music is necessarily dynamic in 
two ways. All art must begin with its creation. For music, the creation is 
by the composer, for painting the painter, and for sculpture the sculptor. 
But once a painting or sculpture is completed (in most cases, setting 
aside certain forms of interactive or performance art), the conduct is 
complete. Even if different audiences view and understand the work in 
myriad ways, the artwork is itself static. A composer creates music, but 
music involves a second stage of conduct in its performance, which is 
dynamic. As Dewey described: 
 
 
Music, having sounds as its medium, thus necessarily expresses in a 
concentrated way the shocks and instabilities, the conflicts and 
resolutions, that are the dramatic changes enacted upon the more 
enduring background of nature and human life. The tension and the 
struggle has its gatherings of energy, its discharges, its attacks and 
defenses, its mighty warrings and its peaceful meetings, its resistances 
and resolutions, and out of these things music weaves its web. It is thus 
at the opposite pole from the sculptural. As one expresses the 
enduring, the stable and universal, so the other expresses stir, agitation, 
movement, the particulars and contingencies of existences—which, 
nevertheless, are as ingrained in nature and as typical in experience as 
are its structural permanences.191 
But it is not only the dynamism of the specific musical performance 
that distinguishes instrumental music from other forms of art. In 
addition, unlike other nonrepresentational art forms, instrumental music 
is capable of being created, performed, and reperformed and 
reinterpreted anew on repeated, potentially infinite, occasions.192 Each 
performance may convey the expression in a unique manner and be 
interpreted in a universe of ways. The variation in performance is 
important because each new performance reproduces the autonomy and 
cultural protection arguments potentially justifying First Amendment 
protection.193 
One could take these latter points to support the idea that music 
expresses in a different way than painting or sculpture. But dance can 
also be performed and interpreted by each new dancer and is equally 
dynamic in both senses. To be sure, while there are strong connections 
between dance and music (including the fact that most dance is 
performed to music), there are also differences worth mentioning. And 
 
 191. Dewey, supra note 188, at 236. 
 192. For an interesting account of the multitude of interpretations of one of the most well-known 
pieces of classical music, see Matthew Guerrieri, The First Four Notes: Beethoven’s Fifth and the 
Human Imagination (2012). 
 193. See infra Part III.B.2. 
Chen-66.2.doc (Do Not Delete) 3/21/2015 4:21 PM 
February 2015]      INSTRUMENTAL MUSIC AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 417 
there are factors that distinguish instrumental music from all other art 
forms. First, music is the only form of art that is communicated entirely 
through auditory means. There are no visual cues or associations to 
interpret, no images to look at, no colors, textures, or forms. Second, 
instrumental music is the only art form that is always 
nonrepresentational. A painting, sculpture, or dance can depict ideas and 
images in a literal way or an abstract way, opening the door to inquiries 
about whether only those art forms that convey an understandable 
message, as the Court suggested in Spence, ought to count as speech.194 
The composition and performance of instrumental music can never 
convey an idea or thought in a literal sense, and no listener can discern a 
literal meaning from hearing such music. Unlike other art forms, 
instrumental music can never be propositional, and therefore presents 
the purest form of artistic expression for First Amendment theory 
purposes. The next Subpart examines the ways in which instrumental 
music might be considered expressive. 
B. The Specific Communicative Aspects of Instrumental Music 
From these foundations, a theory of instrumental music as speech 
must build the case for why such music falls within the purposes of the 
First Amendment. We have already surveyed the three main theoretical 
justifications for music as speech—promoting democratic self-
governance; advancing the search for truth; and promoting autonomy 
(however defined). If we were considering lyrical or vocal music, the 
discussion would be simpler because we could examine the lyrics for 
their content and discuss how the freedom to engage in those verbal 
expressions advanced any of these three main theories. But separating 
out the tonal and rhythmic components of musical expression presents 
significant theoretical (as well as doctrinal) complexities that neither the 
courts nor legal scholars have adequately addressed. 
In the following Subparts, this Article discusses five different 
possible ways of understanding the communicative component of 
instrumental music. The first three are what I categorize as “cognitive 
claims,” each of which has power, but none of which ultimately can be 
squared with conventional speech theory in a way that is workable in 
either a theoretical or a doctrinal sense. The fourth category—music as 
an expression of cultural, religious, nationalist, or other social values—
holds greater promise as a type of communication that the First 
Amendment ought to cover, even if it cannot be understood to involve 
particularized messages. The fifth and final category, which considers 
 
 194. See Miller v. Civil City of S. Bend, 904 F.2d 1081, 1125 (7th Cir. 1990) (Easterbrook, J., 
dissenting) (“Ballet rarely approaches absolute music in abstraction.”), rev’d sub nom. Barnes v. Glen 
Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560 (1991). 
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music as a powerful conveyor of emotional feeling and sensibility, also 
provides a more solid grounding for understanding instrumental music as 
speech. 
1. Three Cognitive Claims 
As the prior free speech theory discussion and the earlier case law 
survey suggest, an important justification for covering expression under 
the First Amendment is to promote the conveyance of specific messages, 
ideas, beliefs, and thoughts. In its most fundamental form, speech is 
about transmitting these things to others, which requires cognitive 
engagement. Thus, if instrumental music is “speech,” it is important to 
examine the degree to which it might facilitate cognitive reactions in its 
listeners. There are three possible ways of thinking about instrumental 
music and cognition. 
a. Instrumental Music as Evocative/Associative of 
Cognitive Thought 
One claim might be that instrumental music, though by definition 
nonverbal and nonpropositional (examined more below), nonetheless 
provokes meaningful cognitive responses in its listeners. Though music 
might not convey a particular message, it may be ultimately generative of 
conscious thoughts and ideas in the sense that some music is strongly 
associated or evocative of specific ideas or themes that are themselves 
defined by social context. I will call this the associative claim. 
For example, a purely instrumental work may have a provocative or 
controversial title. Though the music itself is targeted by censors, it is not 
the musical content per se that is objectionable, but its association with 
the work’s title. Thus, as described briefly earlier, the song “Rumble,” 
recorded by Link Wray and the Wray Men, was banned by American 
radio stations in the late 1950s.195 The explanation provided was that the 
song was associated with street violence, which broadcasters were 
presumably afraid would be inspired in those who listened to the song.196 
Again, although the work was itself purely instrumental, the music itself 
was associated with a social problem. 
In another incident that may reflect this mode of thinking about 
instrumental music, Meyer Music Markets, a chain retailer in the Pacific 
Northwest, created a record labeling program modeled on the 
controversial efforts of the RIAA.197 The retail chain then required that 
its outlets label copies of the Frank Zappa album, Jazz from Hell, with an 
“explicit lyrics” sticker, even though the album was comprised entirely of 
 
 195. Bernstein, supra note 7. 
 196. Id. 
 197. Nuzum, supra note 7, at 39. 
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instrumental music.198 The retailer’s labeling committee apparently 
assumed that the album must be controversial because Zappa was an 
outspoken critic of the RIAA and the Parents Music Resource Center, a 
private advocacy group whose founder, Tipper Gore, had strongly 
pushed for labeling standards.199 It is also possible that, like the Link 
Wray instrumental, Zappa’s album was censored because of the title of 
the album itself or because of the titles of some of the album’s individual 
instrumental tracks (for example, “G-Spot Tornado”). Another example 
is instrumental music that is censored because of its association with a 
different art form, such as a motion picture. The BBC banned the 
broadcast of the purely instrumental theme song from the Frank Sinatra 
movie, The Man with the Golden Arm, because of the song’s connection 
to a film about heroin addiction.200 
In other instances, purely instrumental music may have specific 
communicative qualities that are intended by the performer and widely 
understood by the intended audience. For example, southern states banned 
African drumming in early American slave cultures during the late 1700s 
and early 1800s, because different drumming patterns communicated, and 
were understood to communicate, specific and concrete messages, such as 
signaling slave rebellions.201 
Other music has developed particular meanings within the relevant 
community. During World War II, anti-German resistance fighters in 
Belgium adopted the letter “V” as their symbol, representing both the 
French word for victory (“victoire”) and the Flemish word for freedom 
(“vrijheid”).202 Officials at the BBC wanted to use the V symbol in their 
broadcasts to demonstrate support for the resistance fighters, and 
someone suggested using the Morse code symbol for V, which consists of 
three short signals and a long signal.203 BBC officials noticed that the 
famous opening of Beethoven’s Fifth Symphony shared the same 
cadence as the Morse code symbol for V, and that became their signal to 
listeners to alert them to pro-ally broadcasts.204 
Yet another example of music that conveys specific ideas or 
information is music cryptograms. Cryptograms use sequences of musical 
notes to convey messages by associating certain notes with letters of the 
alphabet, thus making it possible to hide a verbal message in a musical 
 
 198. Id. 
 199. Id. at 24–39. 
 200. Horsfield, supra note 7. 
 201. Ted Gioia, The History of Jazz 7 (1997); Robert Palmer, Deep Blues 33 (1982). 
 202. Guerrieri, supra note 192, at 211. 
 203. Id. 
 204. Id. at 212–14. 
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score.205 Many classical composers, most famously Bach, used 
cryptograms to embed family names and other messages into their 
compositions.206 There is even some historical evidence of the use of 
music cryptograms to carry out espionage or other actions the speakers 
hoped to hide from the government.207 
Each of these is a possible instance of instrumental music being used 
to communicate in ways we might consider worthy of protection under 
the First Amendment. Under any of the three major theories—
democracy, truth, or autonomy—one could make the case for protection 
of music because it is associated, directly or indirectly, with particularized 
messages. The problem with this understanding of music as speech is that 
if music is really just a code for verbal expression, then it may not 
actually be the musical component of the expression that is 
communicative. For example, if an African drum beat or pipe tune is 
intended by both performer and listener to convey a specific message—
one that can be reduced to words, such as “help” or “warning”—then 
instrumental music in these contexts is really no different from Morse 
code. It is a series of beats or notes, rather than dots and dashes, that has 
specific and understood linguistic meanings. The same could be said for 
cryptograms.208 In this context, while there would be the easiest 
justification for categorizing instrumental music as speech, the reasons 
actually make music here less conceptually interesting because it is not 
really distinct from traditional speech. That is, the problem with this 
approach to considering instrumental music as speech is that the very 
representational associations the music has may in fact take it out of the 
realm of pure instrumental speech. 
Moreover, this form of musical expression arguably already might 
be covered within an existing doctrinal framework, the law of conduct as 
speech. In United States v. O’Brien, the Court held that one of the 
factors in determining whether nonverbal conduct may be speech 
protected by the First Amendment is whether “the governmental interest 
[in regulating that conduct] is unrelated to the suppression of free 
expression.”209 Thus, under O’Brien, musical expression is conduct that is 
protected only when the government’s interest in regulating it is to 
address its speech or cognitive component. Under this doctrine, 
 
 205. The Musical Cryptogram, Classical.com, http://www.classical.com/musical-cryptogram (last 
visited Feb. 2, 2015). 
 206. Marcus du Sautoy, The Magic Numbers: A Fascination with Figures Runs Through the Music 
of Composers from Mozart to Bach, Guardian, Apr. 5, 2013, at 14; see also Wright, supra note 13, at 
1247 & n.170 (suggesting that coded messages, including musical scores, are speech because even 
though they may not be generally understandable, they have meaning for their intended audience). 
 207. The Musical Cryptogram, supra note 205. 
 208. See Alexander, supra note 127, at 8 (suggesting that it would be difficult to see how sign 
language or pictographs could be excluded from the category of speech). 
 209. 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968). 
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explaining protection of instrumental music that conveys an 
unambiguous message is a relatively easy task. In the examples discussed 
above, the governments or other power holders have attempted to 
regulate instrumental music not because of its musical elements, but 
because of its cognitive message. But O’Brien permits the government to 
regulate the noncognitive, nonverbal part of the conduct if it has a 
sufficient interest. Taking away the message-conveying aspect of the 
African drumming signals, the conduct is simply the beating of the drum 
head surface, which is content-free conduct, like draft card burning. In 
fact, O’Brien’s analysis would logically lead to the conclusion that the 
musical component of the expression is not protected, or at least that the 
speech and conduct cases do not explain constitutional protection for all 
instrumental music. For similar reasons, instrumental music that is 
censored because it is directly associated with an idea, through its title, 
lyrics, or otherwise, can be viewed as more closely linked to an appeal to 
an idea or cognitive function, and is unhelpful for understanding the 
purer or harder case. 
b. Instrumental Music as Enhancing Other  Communicative 
Messages 
A second conceptualization of the cognitive value of instrumental 
music is that the melodic and rhythmic components of musical expression 
may sometimes interact in meaningful ways with lyrics or other verbal 
messages, combining to express something that is both greater than, and 
distinctive from, the lyrics alone. I refer to this as the enhancement claim. 
Consider a song that is read out loud, but with no musical accompaniment. 
The lyrics would be communicative in their own right. But they might not 
convey the ideas or information or sentiments in the same way—with the 
same emphases and dynamic tension—that they might if they were sung 
with musical accompaniment. Understood in this way, music may 
influence the lyrical text in a manner similar to the way that visual images 
sometimes enhance verbal messages. As one commentator notes, 
[A] number of studies have concluded that texts incorporating visual 
images (sometimes referred to as “visuals”) are more effective at 
influencing people’s beliefs than texts containing only words (e.g., a 
book), sounds (e.g., instrumental music), or even texts combining both 
words and sounds (e.g., vocal recordings) . . . . Sound recordings are 
the most powerful conveyor of beliefs after visuals.210 
The importance of instrumental music in enhancing lyrical expression is 
only understood if the musical components are separated out and 
 
 210. Claire Wright, Reconciling Cultural Diversity and Free Trade in the Digital Age: A Cultural 
Analysis of the International Trade in Content Items, 41 Akron L. Rev. 399, 464–65 n.337 (2008) 
(citing Daniel J. Levitin, This is Your Brain on Music: The Science of a Human Obsession (2006)). 
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determined to have a communicative impact independent of, or more 
accurately, supplementing, the vocal elements of a performance. 
If music has an identifiable speech-enhancing component that 
influences verbal expression in an independent, meaningful way, then 
protection of instrumental music can be justified on the grounds that it 
promotes self-governance, the search for truth, and self-realization. We 
might view with skepticism the censorship of an overtly political song 
whose message is enhanced by its musical elements because of the resulting 
interference with democratic self-governance. Consider, for example, the 
difference in inspirational meaning derived from singing a protest song 
such as “We Shall Overcome,” as opposed to simply reading its lyrics out 
loud.211 Similarly, a song whose lyrics are directed toward the exposition 
of nonpolitical ideas or information with similar musical enhancement 
might be viewed as protected under a truth-searching or autonomy theory. 
There is even doctrinal support for the enhancement claim. In 
Cohen v. California,212 the Supreme Court reviewed the case of a man 
who was convicted for disturbing the peace when he wore a jacket 
bearing the words “Fuck the Draft” into a public courthouse.213 
Although the state asserted the power to regulate speech because of its 
offensive nature, the Court invalidated Cohen’s conviction, finding that 
the profanity that he used to express his clearly political views had 
speech value because it conveyed the emotional force of his beliefs.214 In 
other words, the specific words Cohen chose to communicate his 
opposition to the government’s policy enhanced his message through 
their emotional impact. “Fuck the Draft” transmits the passion of 
Cohen’s opposition to the draft more powerfully than something more 
muted, like “That Darned Draft.” Although the analogy to Cohen is 
useful, its analysis still focused on the linguistic aspects of the speakers’ 
message. 
 
 211. Singing has long played a role in protests and social movements as both a means for 
conveying messages and inspiring participants. From the work of American folk singers Woody 
Guthrie and Pete Seeger in the twentieth century to the contemporary protest music of Pussy Riot, 
musicians have been incorporating social justice messages into their songs in an effort to express 
dissatisfaction with the status quo. See Bart Barnes, Folk Singer Wanted Everyone to be Heard, 
Wash. Post, Jan. 29, 2014, at A1; Chris Kornelis, Woody Guthrie Gave Life to Protest Songs He 
Wrote, Sang, Wash. Times, Oct. 11, 2012, at C10; Carol Rumens, Pussy Riot’s Punk Prayer Is Pure 
Protest Poetry, Guardian (Aug. 20, 2012), http://www.theguardian.com/books/2012/aug/20/pussy-riot-
punk-prayer-lyrics; see also Buffalo Springfield, For What It’s Worth, on Buffalo Springfield 
(ATCO Records 1967). The international scope of such expression is widely noted. See Anne Schumann, 
The Beat That Beat Apartheid: The Role of Music in the Resistance Against Apartheid in South Africa, 
14 Vienna J. Afr. Stud. 17 (2008); Sebnem Arsu, The Music Started, and the Protest Paused, N.Y. Times, 
June 15, 2013, at C1. 
 212. 403 U.S. 15 (1971). 
 213. Id. at 16. For an interesting evaluation of the role of the word “fuck” in American legal 
culture, see Christopher M. Fairman, Fuck, 28 Cardozo L. Rev. 1711 (2007). 
 214. Cohen, 403 U.S. at 25–26. 
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The limit of the enhancement claim, however, comes from the 
notion that the musical elements of the speech are inherently tied to 
verbal expression. If the reason music is expressive is solely derivative 
through its enhancement of the verbal, it may have little or no 
independent expressive value. To some degree (though the comparison is 
not quite complete), it is no different from an amplification device such 
as a megaphone. And if it has no distinctive substance, it would 
necessarily be regulated only where it is attached to the verbal message, 
and therefore unlikely to need additional First Amendment protection 
that would not already be afforded to the lyrics. Greenman observes: 
One might say that music is protected because it usually complements 
language, that rulemaking tends to be categorical, and that instrumental 
music is only protected by dint of its association with vocal music. This 
is undoubtedly true to some degree. But even so, there must be some 
principle determining what is communicative other than “association 
with language.” People talk during violence, but violence is never 
communication.215 
Ultimately, the enhancement claim cannot stand alone as a justification 
to protect instrumental music under the First Amendment.216 
c. Instrumental Music and Cognition 
To this point, I have conceded that instrumental music does not 
directly appeal to or stimulate any sort of cognitive reasoning. Before 
leaving the topic, however, it is worth considering whether I have given 
up too easily on a direct cognitive defense. I refer to this as the pure 
cognitive claim. Most theorists would argue that instrumental music is a 
form of nonpropositional expression, meaning that it does not intend (or 
does not always intend) to convey, nor can it be understood to convey, a 
particular, identifiable message.217 While that is undoubtedly the case, 
that is not tantamount to saying that instrumental music does not 
stimulate, inspire, suggest, or provoke cognitive processes. 
Indeed, some music theorists reject the idea that instrumental music 
is not representational. For example, as Karol Berger observes, “‘most or 
even all music will likely have to be considered representational,’ for 
reasons analogous to those brought forward by Richard Wollheim in 
 
 215. Greenman, supra note 13, at 1367 n.136. 
 216. One possibility that I do not account for is that musical expression may be inextricably linked 
not only to its lyrics and title, but also to its social history and the context in which it is composed, 
performed, heard, and experienced. If this is the case, then the theoretical attempt to disaggregate 
music into its component parts may be misguided. If, indeed, music cannot be disentangled from its 
social history, this would present a strong, alternative claim for why it is covered by the First 
Amendment. I am grateful to Rebecca Aviel for pointing out this potential complexity. Because it is 
beyond the ambition of this Article, for now I set this argument aside for future discussion. 
 217. Tushnet, supra note 3, at 203 n.117; see also Bezanson, Art and Freedom, supra note 3, at 
280 (describing most art as nonpropositional). 
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support of his thesis that both figurative and abstract painting are species 
of representational art.”218 If this point is valid, however, what exactly is 
being represented? Berger suggests that the music may be representative 
of a person or object: 
In instrumental music, or in vocal music with independent (obbligato is 
the technical term) instrumental line(s), the instrumental line can 
sometimes be attributed to a source that resembles to a certain degree 
a human person or another object we could name, but it can also 
remain so abstract that we will not be tempted to attribute it to a 
human or any other kind of recognizable source.219 
One could object to the claimed representational value, here, because of 
Berger’s qualification that such attribution can be made only “sometimes.” 
However, spoken or written words can sometimes also be communicated 
in ways that do not have representational value, yet we do not dispute 
their protection under the First Amendment.220 
Similarly, the formal reliance on language as a precondition of 
constitutional protection may overemphasize the belief that all language 
conveys unambiguous ideas or information. Language cannot always 
convey experiences the way that the arts are capable of doing. Berger 
argues: 
Language’s attempt to name the particular is always frustratingly 
imprecise when compared with a direct experience of the particular, 
because the name brings the particular under a general concept, 
associates it with many other particulars, and thus blunts the sharp 
edges of its particularity. But . . . this tells us something about the 
nature of language, not of music.221 
In a widely cited letter, Felix Mendelssohn expressed a similar, though 
counterintuitive sentiment: 
People complain usually that music is so ambiguous, that it is so 
doubtful what they should think with it, while words are understood by 
anyone. But for me it is exactly the other way around. And not just 
with whole speeches, also with individual words; also these seem to me 
so ambiguous, so indefinite, so easily misunderstood in comparison 
with true music . . . . What a piece of music which I love tells me are for 
me not thoughts that are too indefinite to be grasped in words, but 
ones too definite. Thus I find in all attempts to express these thoughts 
in language something right, but also something insufficient. . . . 
because a word does not mean for one what it means for another, 
because only a song (without words) can tell one the same thing it tells 
 
 218. Karol Berger, A Theory of Art 173–74 (2000). 
 219. Id. at 174. 
 220. And, of course, a single word’s meaning may vary widely depending on its usage, context, and 
emphasis. See generally Fairman, supra note 213. 
 221. Berger, supra note 218, at 209. 
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another, can awaken in him the same feeling, a feeling, however, which 
does not express itself in the same words.222 
Nietzsche similarly observed that “in relation to music, all communication 
by means of words is of the shameless sort.”223 If we are to accept 
Mendelssohn’s claim, however, we must be willing to embrace a paradox—
that instrumental music is both a precise form of expression and, at the 
same time, not reducible to words. Furthermore, the meaning is 
apparently, and unapologetically, subjective. For Mendelssohn writes 
about not all works of music, but works that he loves, and what they tell 
him. 
Furthermore, instrumental music could be conceived as conveying 
cognitive messages not about language, but about mathematical patterns, 
sequences, and harmonies. After all, as others have noted, in ancient 
Greece, music was considered to be one of the four mathematical liberal 
arts, or quadrivium.224 
Another question is whether this cognitive understanding of 
instrumental music differs from its value as expressive of emotion—or 
even if it does differ, how it can be conceptualized as expressive in a 
manner with which the First Amendment ought to be concerned. The 
emerging interdisciplinary field of music cognition, in which scholars 
study the connection between musical expression and cognitive function, 
may lend some insights into this somewhat non-intuitive claim.225 Even if 
a connection between instrumental music and cognition were established, 
however, there may be an important expressive difference between 
stimulating cognitive functioning and communicating an identifiable 
message. In any event, we probably still know far too little about this 
field to suggest that a legal theory be built on its foundation. 
Furthermore, it is unclear which of the predominant speech theories 
this definition of musical expression fits under. Even if we accept that 
instrumental music conveys definite thoughts in the sense that 
Mendelssohn described, without a common understanding of such 
thoughts, it is impossible to determine either why the expression is 
valuable or how the state would know that it needs to be suppressed (or, 
for that matter, how a court would know that it deserves First 
Amendment protection). Thus, it is difficult to see how this type of 
cognitive understanding could be justified under a democratic self-
governance theory. Perhaps, however, the unspecified cognitive thoughts 
generated by instrumental music may help a listener to understand 
certain truths, and that this conception is actually supported by the search 
 
 222. Id. at 210. 
 223. Lawrence Kramer, Expression and Truth on the Music of Knowledge 98 (2012). 
 224. Carroll, supra note 15, at 1422. 
 225. See, e.g., Hans Heinrich Eggebrecht, Understanding Music: The Nature and Limits of 
Musical Cognition (2010). 
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for truth rationale, or some versions of it. Just because the state cannot 
identify the area of inquiry or thought does not mean that its interference 
with musical expression does not inhibit the individual’s ability to reach 
that truth on her own. And it does not even have to be an abstract or 
metaphysical truth. Music might lead one to understand truths in a 
philosophical or spiritual sense, if not a political (narrowly defined) one. 
Finally, if music stimulates nonspecific cognitive processes in the 
listener, it is certainly true that autonomy is undermined by the 
government’s prevention of the ability to hear that music. The Court’s 
strong admonition in Stanley about the impropriety of the state’s role in 
controlling what we may read or watch surely applies to what we listen 
to.226 If this is true for legally obscene movies, so it must be true for the 
experience of listening to music of one’s choice, particularly if that music 
is understood to have a specific cognitive content. Ultimately, however, 
the idea of instrumental music as cognitive expression lacks sufficient 
support at this point to justify its coverage as speech under the First 
Amendment. 
2. Instrumental Music as an Expression of Culture,  Religion, and 
Other Social Values 
Music that is not tied to a specific idea or message can nonetheless 
be closely associated with cultural, ethnic, religious, and social values. 
Here, we can identify a distinct expressive value to the instrumental 
aspects of music, and one that can be harmonized with specific First 
Amendment theories. We can call this the cultural claim. There are 
numerous examples of instrumental music censorship because of these 
culturally expressive values that provide a context for understanding why 
constitutional protection might be important. 
Instrumental music expresses culture in several important ways. 
First, while most North Americans and Europeans are familiar with the 
Western twelve-note chromatic scale, music from other cultures is 
distinctly identifiable by its reliance on other scales that include 
additional notes that fall in between the tones of those twelve notes.227 
This is exemplified by the Indian raga, which uses intervals smaller than 
those in the Western scale, creating a sound that resonates of South 
Asian culture. Another example involves the African influence on 
American roots music, particularly the blues, which uses notes, such as 
the so called “blue” note, a pitch that falls between a major and minor 
third above the chord’s root. The blue note is not commonly used in 
American music that has been heavily influenced by its European 
antecedents. 
 
 226. 394 U.S. 557, 565 (1969). 
 227. See Munkittrick, supra note 4, at 670. 
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Some forms of singing involve no words, but instead use tones and 
timbres that are indigenous to and distinctive of a particular culture. One 
commentator observes: 
Cultural preferences for particular vocal timbres are, like the entire 
process of vocalization, essentially intuitive. We learn how a singer’s 
voice should sound by hearing singers, and the preferred timbres of our 
own musical culture are acquired early and usually taken for granted. 
The automatic nature of this conditioning is apparent when we hear 
singing from an unfamiliar culture with aesthetic values different than 
our own.228 
A paradigmatic example of this phenomenon is Tuvan throat singing, 
which involves the use of the singer’s vocal apparatus to produce a 
droning sound while simultaneously making audible melodic sounds 
through the production of overtones.229 Such singing “both imitates and 
interacts with the mountainous, riverine landscape of the Tuvan 
countryside, and the horse-centered lifestyle of the Tuvan people.”230 
Differences in meter are also important and, again, often specifically 
identifiable with particular cultures. Thus, rhythmic and polyrhythmic 
patterns may be distinctively associated with culture. The Black Codes’ 
bans on slave drumming were, at one time, thought to have been an 
attempt to eliminate African polyrhythms from black music in 
America.231 More recently, African rhythms were the source of at least 
one concern about the emergence of rock and roll music in the 1950s, as 
censors worried that the beats were highly sexualized.232 There was a 
pervasive and fairly transparent racial bias embedded in these concerns 
about the rhythms of rock as well.233 
In addition, adapting performances of the music of one culture to 
the instruments, scales, rhythms, and musicality of a very different 
culture can produce a completely new cross-cultural musical creation that 
evokes new meaning. An acute example of this is the performance of 
Brubeck’s American jazz classic “Take Five” by Pakistan’s Sachal 
Studios Orchestra.234 This type of musical cross-fertilization is also 
represented in the mutual influence of African and American music on 
 
 228. James R. Cowdery & Stan Scott, Exploring the World of Music: An Introduction to 
Music From a World Music Perspective 163 (Dorothea E. Hast ed., 1999). 
 229. Id. The Tuvans are nomadic herders who live in the mountains of Central Asia. Id. 
 230. Id. 
 231. Palmer, supra note 201, at 36–37. For a discussion of the culturally unique polyrhythms of 
African music, see Gioia, supra note 201, at 11. 
 232. Linda Martin & Kerry Segrave, Anti-rock: The Opposition to Rock ’n’ Roll 53 (1993). Of 
particular interest here is the announcement of a San Antonio City Councilman that “[t]he First 
Amendment should not apply to rock and roll.” Id. at 271. 
 233. See id. at 41. 
 234. Sachal Studios Orchestra, Take Five, on Sachal Jazz: Interpretations of Jazz 
Standards & Bossa Nova (Sachal Music 2011). I am grateful to Ash Bhagwat, from both a musical 
and analytical standpoint, for introducing me to this performance. 
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one another during the emergence of jazz music in the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries.235 “Anthropologists call this process ‘syncretism’—the 
blending together of cultural elements that previously existed 
separately.”236 This also reflects the notion that what probably “feels” like it 
belongs to a particular culture is at least in part socially constructed.237 
Preservation of music has long been an essential component of 
maintaining culture over generations. The preeminent jazz historian Ted 
Gioia notes:  
The concept of progress plays a modest role in most ethnic musics . . . . 
The griots of West Africa aim to preserve their musical tradition as it is 
handed down to them. This is not a mere aesthetic choice, but a 
cultural imperative: they are the historians of their society and must 
maintain the integrity of their precious musical heritage. Such an 
attitude defines casual experimentation.238 
Consistent with the understanding that the association between 
music and culture is strong, the U.N. Educational, Scientific, and 
Cultural Organization and World Intellectual Property Organization 
crafted the 1982 Model Provisions for National Laws on the Protection 
of Expressions of Folklore Against Illicit Exploitation and Other 
Prejudicial Actions. These standards define “expressions of folklore” to 
include: “[p]roductions consisting of characteristic elements of the 
traditional artistic heritage developed and maintained by a 
community . . . or by individuals reflecting the traditional artistic 
expectations of such a community, in particular . . . (ii) musical 
expressions, such as folk songs and instrumental music.”239  
Music can also be closely associated with religion, making it a 
potential target for government regulation. As discussed earlier, two 
recent federal cases involved challenges to public schools’ efforts to ban 
instrumental music because of its religious associations.240 In both cases, 
the schools chose to ban student musical performances because they 
believed that permitting them would raise concerns about the schools’ 
neutrality toward religion, generating complaints from parents and 
potentially violating the Establishment Clause.241 But in neither case did 
the schools categorically ban the performance or study of religious 
 
 235. See Gioia, supra note 201, at 5. 
 236. Id. 
 237. Carroll, supra note 15, at 1417 (“Music has no intrinsic definition. It is a cultural category 
consisting of any sounds that those in a society or culture designate as ‘music’ instead of ‘noise,’ along 
with any notation, recording, or other means of capturing or representing such sounds.”). 
 238. Gioia, supra note 201, at 200. 
 239. U.N. Educ., Scientific, & Cultural Org. & World Intellectual Prop. Org., Model 
Provisions for National Laws on the Protection of Expressions of Folklore Against Illicit 
Exploitation and Other Prejudicial Actions 9–10 (1985). 
 240. Nurre v. Whitehead, 580 F.3d 1087 (9th Cir. 2009); Stratechuk v. Bd. of Educ., 587 F.3d 597 
(3d Cir. 2009). 
 241. Nurre, 580 F.3d at 1096; Stratechuk, 587 F.3d at 604. 
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music.242 In Nurre, the school expressly permitted performance of 
religious music at midyear concerts if the purpose of the performance 
was for the “artistic value” and was performed along with an “equal 
number of other non-religious works.”243 In Stratechuk, the school 
district’s policy permitted the study of religious music in the curriculum 
“provided that it achieve[d] specific goals of the written curriculum in 
various fields of study; that it [was] presented objectively; and that it 
neither inhibit[ed] nor advance[d] any religious point of view.”244 In 
these examples, we see government actors connecting even instrumental 
music with religious belief, and the understanding that its expression 
conveys a message or idea of religious significance that the state did not 
want to appear to endorse or favor. Interestingly, the schools’ policies 
raise the question of whether musical expression takes on a different 
meaning depending on the context in which it is performed. As Dewey 
once asked, “[i]s the same music nonrepresentative when played in a 
concert hall and representative when it is part of a sacramental service in 
a church?”245 
Conversely, instrumental music can be associated with sacrilege, or 
with conduct or values that are sacrilegious. In many sectarian-
dominated government regimes, censorship of instrumental music on 
these grounds is common. Though scholars of Islamic culture have 
divergent views about music’s role in Islam,246 the previously Taliban-
controlled Afghanistan247 and the current Iranian government248 have 
banned instrumental music because of its association with non-
puritanical values, licentious lifestyles, and alcohol or drug use. And, of 
course, religiously based music censorship is by no means limited to 
Islam, as the Catholic Church’s ban on the tritone and descant make 
clear.249 
Music can not only be reflective or representative of existing or past 
cultures, but also may operate to construct and define cultures. The 
experience of banned Jewish composers and performers during the Nazi 
regime reflects their struggle to maintain two important strands of 
musical influence—they were both Germans and Jews and both were 
constitutive of their musical culture.250 The Reichsmusikkammer tried to 
 
 242. Nurre, 580 F.3d at 1091; Stratechuk, 587 F.3d at 599–600. 
 243. Nurre, 580 F.3d at 1091. 
 244. Stratechuk, 587 F.3d at 599. 
 245. Dewey, supra note 188, at 223. Because I am concerned in this Article only with First 
Amendment coverage, I do not address the idea that even if instrumental music is covered, it might 
still be subject to some regulation depending on the context in which it is performed. 
 246. Abd-Allah, supra note 10, at 30–31. 
 247. Moss, supra note 10. 
 248. Tait, supra note 10. 
 249. See Rohrer, supra note 95; Blecha, supra note 97, at 15–16. 
 250. Haas, supra note 9, at 231–35. 
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reconstruct domestic culture by reimagining German music without its 
important Jewish influences. At the same time the Kulturbund was its 
attempt to isolate Jewish musical culture and distinguish and separate it 
from what was “truly” German.251 More contemporary examples of 
music (albeit in these cases, lyrical as well as instrumental) as constitutive 
of culture are communities that have formed around groups such as the 
Grateful Dead (the “Deadheads”)252 and Insane Clown Posse (the 
“Juggalos”).253 Each of these groups self identifies as its own distinctive 
subculture. 
To the extent that governments might censor instrumental music to 
destroy or suppress cultural, ethnic, or religious values or identities or as 
a way of implementing moral or social regulation, they are engaged in a 
type of content discrimination that is familiar to traditional First 
Amendment doctrine. With respect to First Amendment theory, viewing 
instrumental music as an expression of cultural, religious, social, and 
moral values suggests that at the very least it should be covered under a 
truth-seeking and autonomy-based theory of freedom of speech. If we 
view the First Amendment as protecting a diversity of ideas, beliefs, and 
values about culture, religion, and society, protection of this aspect of 
musical expression advances the ability to experience cultural diversity as 
reflected through that music. Still, one might object to the truth-based 
claim on the ground that even in this context, music is not expressing 
particular ideas or beliefs, and its suppression does not interfere directly 
with the individual or the collective desire to achieve truth, assuming we 
are viewing the achievement of truth as some sort of rational process. 
Turning to autonomy-based theories, the cultural claim might lead 
to the conclusion that autonomy over the formation of one’s cultural, 
religious, or moral identity is advanced by protection against government 
control over the range of musical expressions of that identity. Identity 
formation might not be ideational or involve the exercise of judgments, 
and therefore might not fall within Scanlon’s concept of autonomy. But it 
may be an important aspect of self-realization, as conceived of by 
Redish, and also mesh well with Shiffrin’s thinker-based autonomy 
theory,254 which acknowledges the value of becoming a distinct individual 
(cultural and religious affinity) and living among others (distinguishing 
oneself as well as connecting with others through culture and religion). 
 
 251. Id. 
 252. Grateful Dead: The Illustrated Trip 138 (Jake Woodward et al. eds., 2003). 
 253. Scott Mervis, Insane Clown Posse Is Back in the Dark Carnival, Pitt. Post-Gazette, May 20, 
2010, at W10. These cultures are much more than what might be called “fan clubs,” but are, by their 
nature and self-identification, subcultures of society. In an interesting twist, Insane Clown Posse and 
some of its fans recently sued the Federal Bureau of Investigation for labeling the Juggalos as a 
“gang.” Dave Itzkoff, Rap Group Defends Fans, with Lawsuit, N.Y. Times, Jan. 9, 2014, at C1. 
 254. Shiffrin, supra note 148, at 289–90. 
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This understanding of expression also distinguishes instrumental music 
from other autonomous conduct that we would agree should not be 
protected, such as engaging in violence,255 “trading on the stock 
market,”256 or “playing tennis.”257 
I have thus far set aside the possibility that instrumental music’s 
expression of culture, religion, or values might support a democracy-
based theory of free speech. However, there is also an argument that 
instrumental music might convey values of patriotism and nationalism.258 
Instrumental music’s ability to create social cohesion may in fact enhance 
democracy, though not in the traditional discursive way that free speech 
theorists typically identify. Thus, for example, the marches of John Philip 
Sousa or the national anthems of other nations could be said to be 
strongly identified with such values. Government control of instrumental 
music to instill nationalism or suppress anti-nationalist values could be 
construed as a form of viewpoint discrimination that would justify 
protecting speech even under a narrow version of the democratic self-
governance speech theory. However, it is unclear whether music such as 
Sousa’s is inherently nationalistic or patriotic, or whether it is actually 
just a different example of the associative claim. Sousa’s compositions, 
after all, bear patriotic titles and many of his songs have lyrics. Moreover, 
even nationalism and patriotism can be conceptualized as cultural values, 
which would place this example neatly within the cultural claim, along 
with the notion that protection of nationalistic music advances truth 
seeking and autonomy-based speech values. 
3. Instrumental Music as Expression of Emotion 
A common thread of argument is that instrumental music is 
communicative because it appeals not to reason, but to emotion. Indeed, 
the Supreme Court has recognized music’s capacity to appeal to emotion, 
albeit without a full explanation of that function.259 Like many forms of 
verbal expression, instrumental music has the capacity to inspire, sadden, 
excite, give joy, anger, confuse, frighten, and lead to other forms of 
emotional or visceral responses in the listener. I will label this the 
emotional claim. 
Perhaps the most intuitive argument for music’s expressive value is 
its ability to evoke noncognitive responses in listeners, as well as in its 
composers and performers. That is, completely disassociated from titles, 
linguistic signals, and other forms of art, instrumental music can be 
 
 255. Greenman, supra note 13, at 1339. 
 256. Bork, supra note 11, at 25. 
 257. Id. 
 258. For a general consideration of the nationalistic elements of patriotic symbols, songs, and 
ceremonies, see Alan K. Chen, Forced Patriot Acts, 81 Denv. U. L. Rev. 703 (2004). 
 259. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 790 (1989). 
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expressive in important ways that elicit emotional and spiritual 
responses. The emotional claim therefore perhaps presents the cleanest 
analytical argument for categorizing purely instrumental music as a form 
of constitutionally protected expression. 
This conceptualization of the power of music goes back to at least 
Plato, who wrote that “[m]usical training is a more potent instrument 
than any other, because rhythm and harmony find their way into the 
inward places of the soul, on which they mightily fasten, imparting grace, 
and making the soul of him who is rightly educated graceful, or of him 
who is ill-educated ungraceful.”260 Plato, who may have been influenced 
by Socrates’s views on music, believed that “specific scales, rhythms, and 
instruments can affect human passions in specific ways and thus form 
character.”261 Aristotle, in turn, believed that “[m]usic . . . directly 
imitates (that is, represents) the passions or states of the soul . . . when 
one listens to music that imitates a certain passion, he becomes imbued 
with the same passion.”262 
All three, however, claimed that precisely because music had the 
power to instill passion, it also had the potential for dangerous influences 
on the people. Plato was probably the most wary of the dark side of 
musical expression, attributing moral decline in ancient Greece to the 
composition of licentious musical works.263 He warned that “[a]ny 
musical innovation is full of danger to the whole State, and ought to be 
prohibited. . . . [W]hen modes of music change, the fundamental laws of 
the state always change with them.”264 Similarly, Aristotle wrote of his 
concern for music’s rousing of “ignoble passions.”265 
Hegel also explored musical expression in his lectures on aesthetics, 
although to a lesser degree than he examined other fine arts. 
Interestingly, given the modern tendency (generally, and under the law) 
to focus on music’s lyrical elements, Hegel’s understanding of musical 
expression emphasized the music and observed that when words 
accompany music, they are peripheral to the music itself. He wrote, “the 
text is the servant of the music and it has no other worth than creating for 
our minds a better idea of what the artist has chosen as the subject of his 
work.”266 Hegel conceived of instrumental music as originating in 
“interjection,” which he defined as the immediate utterance of feeling or 
 
 260. Plato, supra note 94, bk. III, at 401.  
 261. Berger, supra note 218, at 120. 
 262. Donald Jay Grout & Claude V. Palisca, A History of Western Music 7–8 (4th ed. 1988). 
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emotion.267 For him, rhythm, harmony, and melody free the soul to hear 
its inner movement and be moved by what it hears.268 More specifically, 
through its conveyance, music allows listeners to experience feelings of 
love, longing, joy, and grief.269 
Schopenhauer also examined the emotional component of 
instrumental music, but viewed its evocation of the emotional at a more 
abstract level. He distinguished the feeling of specific emotions about 
people, things, or events from general feelings. “[M]usic does not express 
this or that particular and definite pleasure, this or that affliction, pain, 
sorrow, horror, gaiety, merriment, or peace of mind, but joy, pain, 
sorrow, horror, gaiety, merriment, peace of mind themselves.”270 
Dewey similarly thought of music as an art that directly stirred 
emotional responses. “[I]n itself the ear is the emotional sense,” he 
wrote.271 He elaborated, “Sounds have the power of direct emotional 
expression. A sound is itself threatening, whining, soothing, depressing, 
fierce, tender, soporific, in its own quality.”272 Moreover, it was 
specifically the instrumental elements of musical expression that bore 
this capacity. “Through the use of instruments, sound is freed from the 
definiteness it has acquired through association with speech. It thus 
reverts to its primitive passional quality.”273 “[B]y the use of harmony 
and melody of tone,” he wrote, music “introduces incredibly varied 
complexities of question, uncertainty, and suspense wherein every tone is 
ordered in reference to others so that each is a summation of what 
precedes and a forecast of what is to come.”274 
On this understanding, instrumental music has the capacity to 
inspire, sadden, excite, give joy, anger, confuse, frighten, and lead to 
other forms of emotional or visceral responses in the listener. While this 
understanding is itself intuitively accepted by many, it is not an 
indisputable interpretation of the expressive qualities of music. There is a 
complex and rich discourse in the field of philosophy of music that 
engages this topic as well, though a complete exposition of the competing 
theories is beyond the scope of this Article.275 
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consists only in this, that, with its inherent tendency toward abstraction, it was able to provide moods 
without the admixture of anything else earlier than the other arts were.”). 
 275. Andrew Kania, The Philosophy of Music, Stan. Encyclopedia Phil. (July 31, 2012), 
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/music/#3. 
Chen-66.2.doc (Do Not Delete) 3/21/2015 4:21 PM 
434 HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 66:381 
Understanding instrumental music as communicating and evoking 
emotion provides arguments both for and against treating it as speech 
under the First Amendment. It most likely weighs against arguments 
from a democratic self-governance perspective, even under broad views 
of what contributes to democracy.276 Meiklejohn argued that the arts 
were constitutionally protected because they are a form of 
communication that allows voters to derive “knowledge, intelligence, 
[and] sensitivity to human values,”277 but it has never been clear in what 
way the arts in general, or music in particular, facilitate that process in 
voters. We typically view the formation of political beliefs and ideals as a 
deliberative and at least quasi-rational process, so it is difficult to see 
how the protection of a form of expression that appeals exclusively to 
emotional sensibilities advances the political process. Even under a more 
nuanced version of the democratic self-governance theory, such as 
Post’s,278 it is unclear how emotional expression contributes to public 
discourse. 
Some theorists might suggest that communication that appeals 
purely to passion or emotion has at least some democracy-promoting 
function. For example, Weinstein acknowledges that there is some power 
to the argument that pornography should not be excluded from the 
category of expression because it appeals to passions rather than 
reason.279 But he adds that it would be odd to then rely on arguments 
that passion-eliciting speech should be protected under a rational 
thought, reason-based speech theory, which is at the core of most 
democracy-based arguments.280 Others, like Martha Nussbaum, however, 
suggest that the distinction between emotion and cognitive deliberation 
is overstated, and that emotions, such as love and grief, are “intelligent 
responses to the perception of value.”281 
Consideration of the value of speech that is purely or primarily 
emotional to either the individual or the collective search for truth is 
more complex. As discussed earlier, most truth-based theories, though 
they extend the freedom of speech realm well beyond the political, are 
still largely about truths in opinion or ideas, whether they be political, 
religious, or philosophical. Even when focused on spiritual truth, these 
theories tend to be about morality and religiosity (or perhaps, as I argue, 
 
 276. See, e.g., Meiklejohn, supra note 132. 
 277. Id. 
 278. See generally Post, supra note 139. 
 279. James Weinstein, Free Speech Values, Hardcore Pornography and the First Amendment: A 
Reply to Professor Koppelman, 31 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 911, 921 (2007). 
 280. Id. 
 281. Martha C. Nussbaum, Upheavals of Thought: The Intelligence of Emotions 1 (2001); see 
Andrew Koppelman, Free Speech and Pornography: A Response to James Weinstein, 31 N.Y.U. Rev. 
L. & Soc. Change 899, 905 n.42 (2007). 
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culture) rather than more abstract conceptions of the spiritual. So truth 
theorists tend to underscore the achievement of truth through speech’s 
contribution to cognitive evaluation and assessment. Even a strong claim 
that instrumental music conveys emotion, then, would not necessarily 
satisfy the truth-finding justification for its protection. 
Autonomy theories appear to present a stronger claim with regard 
to protecting instrumental music on an account that understands music as 
expressing the emotional. The power of that claim, however, depends on 
one’s definition of the scope and purpose of autonomy. That is, the limits 
of autonomy theory to justify the protection of instrumental music as a 
form of emotional expression are, like other critiques, related to 
questions about the level of generality at which autonomy is defined. The 
challenge is to say something more than that protection of instrumental 
musical expression promotes individual self-realization, fulfillment, and 
autonomy.282 What distinguishes instrumental music as a form of 
autonomous expression turns on what type of autonomy we are trying to 
protect. 
Mill spoke about discovery of ideas and protection of opinion, both 
of which fail to encompass the emotional.283 Scanlon’s articulation of 
autonomy focuses on the protection of the autonomous individual’s 
ability to determine for himself “what he should believe or what he 
should do.”284 These iterations of autonomy theory suggest that the 
individual must be able to evaluate and advance independent reasons, 
and weigh the value of others’ opinions against countervailing opinions 
and evidence.285 Even divorced from democracy and truth finding, this 
autonomy theory seems based on protecting the individuals’ ability to 
reason and form opinions without governmental interference or 
distortion, which seems cognitive, not emotional. 
However, viewing concepts of autonomy from the perspectives of 
Redish, Baker, and Shiffrin may provide a sounder basis for claiming 
that emotionally expressive musical speech promotes autonomy in a 
particularized manner. A notion of emotional autonomy as a path to 
individual self-realization leads to a robust argument for First 
Amendment protection for instrumental music. Redish’s self-realization 
is a little harder to link to the emotional claim, as even his broad 
argument for the autonomous individual seems directed at promoting the 
individual’s ability to make “life-affecting decisions,” which implies some 
sort of deliberative, as opposed to emotional, process.286 Although Baker 
 
 282. Tushnet, supra note 3, at 205–07. Because in the end, autonomy is promoted by lots of things 
that are not protected by the First Amendment. 
 283. Mill, supra note 159, at 13–14. 
 284. Scanlon, Theory, supra note 166, at 216. 
 285. Id. 
 286. Redish, supra note 168, at 593. 
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argues that an autonomy theory presents the stronger case for protecting 
what he calls “compositional” music, he never articulates precisely how 
protection of musical expression contributes to the version of autonomy 
he embraces.287 He suggests that “[a] person’s autonomy might 
reasonably be conceived as her capacity to pursue successfully the life 
she endorses—self-authored at least in the sense that, no matter how her 
image of a meaningful life originates, she now can endorse that life for 
reasons that she accepts.”288 If we conceive of that as including the 
individual’s capacity to pursue an autonomous emotional life—through 
the vehicle of composing, performing, or listening to music that makes 
her feel or not feel sad, excited, angry, exhilarated—then Baker’s form of 
autonomy would support protecting instrumental music on the emotional 
claim. 
This type of autonomy claim is also supported by the increasing 
body of neuroscience research, which suggests that the emotions elicited 
by musical expression have direct biological effects on the human brain, 
including the release of dopamine, a chemical neurotransmitter that 
produces pleasurable stimulation and causes the body to desire more 
from the source of stimulation.289 One can imagine a science fiction plot 
in which the state is able to control—through laws, force, and 
medication—individuals’ emotional states in a manner that precludes 
them from self-realization in more than a decisionmaking autonomy 
sense, but from interfering with the core of their very identities. Such 
totalitarian control would be viewed as unacceptable, even if there were 
no comparable interference with traditional forms of speech and political 
deliberation. It is this type of loss of autonomy that Shiffrin’s thinker-
based approach best addresses. Her references to “apprehending the 
true” and “imagination” imply protection of emotional autonomy as 
much as the freedom to deliberate rationally over more concrete aspects 
of existence.290 Moreover, “responding authentically”291 may quite 
arguably encompass being allowed to live one’s life as the emotional 
person one chooses to be. 
 
 287. Baker, supra note 148, at 271. 
 288. Id. at 253. 
 289. See Robert J. Zatorre & Valorie N. Salimpoor, Why Music Makes Our Brain Sing, N.Y. 
Times (June 7, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/09/opinion/sunday/why-music-makes-our-brain-
sing.html (“When pleasurable music is heard, dopamine is released in the striatum . . . which is known 
to respond to naturally rewarding stimuli like food and sex and which is artificially targeted by drugs 
like cocaine and amphetamine.”). 
 290. Shiffrin, supra note 148, at 289–90. 
 291. Id. 
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C. Speech Theory and Instrumental Music 
As we have seen, one of the central challenges to treating 
instrumental music—which is similar to much but not all other artistic 
expression—as speech is that music inherently lacks a particularized 
message or idea. In fact, one of the reasons music can be so uniquely 
expressive is in this very absence of message. It may well be that speech 
theorists have made too much of the line between representational and 
nonrepresentational expression. Words can sometimes be representational 
(taken for their literal meaning), and can sometimes be nonrepresentational, 
symbolic, enhance other speech, bear hidden meaning, or even convey utter 
nonsense.292 A painting, sculpture, or even dance, can be a direct 
representation or realist depiction of an event or action, or it can be an 
abstract or even meaningless image, structure, or movement. One 
solution is to suggest that all forms of art are covered by the First 
Amendment when they are representational, but not when they are 
nonrepresentational.293 But this would be normatively unsatisfactory 
because it would be massively under-inclusive to the extent that we find 
expressive value in nonrepresentational communication. And more 
importantly, on this view, instrumental music would never be covered 
because, as we have seen, isolated from its title, lyrics, and associations, it 
is always nonrepresentational. 
As I argue above, none of the theories about how instrumental 
music communicates fit comfortably under a First Amendment theory 
based on promoting democracy. After full consideration of the possible 
manners in which instrumental music can be expressive, my argument 
comes down to a combination of theories and justifications. Instrumental 
music can best be understood as speech under the First Amendment 
both through the recognition that it advances expression of important 
forms of cultural, religious, nationalist, and other social values, and to the 
extent that music has important aesthetic and emotional expressive 
values, even if in both instances it fails to advance a precise, identifiable 
message. The cultural claim, as discussed in more detail above, suggests 
that music is an important element of constructing, expressing, or 
representing values. As a reflection of cultural, religious, and other social 
values, music serves a cohesive function in that it brings people together 
in important ways. 
 
 292. On the last point, one would do well to carefully read Joseph Blocher’s insightful article. See 
generally Blocher, supra note 79. 
 293. Cf. James Weinstein, Democracy, Sex and the First Amendment, 31 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. 
Change 865, 888–92 (2007) (considering the argument that pornography might be protected when the 
producer’s intent is to change attitudes about sexual mores but not when the producer’s intent is 
merely to provide sexual stimulation). 
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This cohesion building function is clearly illustrated by an anecdote 
about a performance by the Boston Symphony upon the announcement 
of President Kennedy’s assassination. The conductor, Erich Leinsdorf, 
after announcing that the President had died, spontaneously changed the 
program to include the funeral march from the “Eroica,” Beethoven’s 
Third Symphony.294 Recordings of the audience reflect their shocked 
reaction to the news, followed by their silent contemplation of the 
performance, which created a cultural experience of shared grieving 
(though each individual no doubt experienced the moment quite 
personally, as well).295 
In its expression of culture, music serves important social functions 
by connecting people within and between different communities, and its 
recognition as a form of speech ensures that government efforts to 
establish a cultural orthodoxy, like attempts to create a political or 
religious orthodoxy, are thwarted. Instrumental music is therefore 
covered because its protection advances what Jed Rubenfeld calls the 
anti-orthodoxy principle.296 This argument suggests that it undermines 
First Amendment values to allow the government to control cultural 
(including racial) and other values and determine which values are 
worthy, not in a political sense, but in a social one. 
This reasoning is also consistent with a truth-seeking rationale. As 
discussed earlier, truth under this theory is not limited to the 
understanding of ideas, but can embrace religious, spiritual, or as I argue 
here, cultural truths. For there is no one “true” culture or understanding 
of culture, and the government cannot legitimately define what that 
represents.297 Moreover, this definition of truth seeking responds to 
boundary problems by at least limiting truth seeking to the notion of 
cultural and social values, not to every conceivable type of truth. 
At the same time, instrumental music serves a completely 
individualizing function, and therefore ought to be covered by the First 
Amendment to the extent that it promotes highly personal expressions 
and experiences of emotion.298 Instrumental music allows people to 
express (through composition, performance, and feeling) and experience 
(through listening, interpreting, and feeling) as no other medium of 
communication can. Thus, while music serves a community building 
 
 294. James Inverne, Listen to This Chilling Audio as Crowd at Boston Symphony Learns President 
Kennedy Is Dead, Time (Nov. 11, 2013), http://nation.time.com/2013/11/11/boston-symphony-kennedy-
assassination. 
 295. Id. 
 296. Jed Rubenfeld, The First Amendment’s Purpose, 53 Stan. L. Rev. 767, 817–22 (2001). 
 297. I do not mean to say that the government has no role in shaping or supporting different 
cultural values through funding and other types of official support, see Nat’l Endowment for the Arts 
v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569 (1998), but that it is important that the state not attempt to interfere with the 
shaping and natural evolution of various cultures in society. 
 298. See Munkittrick, supra note 4, at 671. 
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function in terms of cultural expression, it simultaneously advances an 
autonomy-promoting function in its facilitation of individualized 
emotional expression and experience. As developed in more detail 
above, music’s role in expressing, evoking, and experiencing the 
emotional could easily be argued to promote self-realization. 
The claim that instrumental music serves an important function in 
constructing and maintaining cultural and other social values and in 
expressing and experiencing emotion also leads us to another argument 
for its inclusion as speech under the First Amendment. Thus far, I have 
focused only on utilitarian or “consequentialist” speech theories, which 
suggest that speech is protected where it advances specific individual or 
social interests, such as democracy and autonomy. Another school of 
First Amendment theorists argues that consequentialist theories are 
inadequate or incomplete in explaining the right of free speech, and that 
a more sound analytical focus is to closely scrutinize the government’s 
reasons for regulating speech rather than on what is being regulated.299 
As Larry Alexander writes, “[f]reedom of expression is implicated 
whenever an activity is suppressed or penalized for the purpose of 
preventing a message from being received.”300 Under this theory, free 
speech “at its core requires regulators to abstain from acting on the basis 
of their own assessments of a message’s truth or value.”301 The idea that 
a “message” is involved still requires us to make an additional analytical 
move to include purely instrumental music because, again, such music is 
always nonpropositional. However, the core of Alexander’s argument is 
essentially that speech ought to be a protected right when the 
government’s reasons for regulating it are based on its belief that the 
speech is either not true or has no value. Surely, a government ban on 
instrumental music for the purpose of interfering with, extinguishing, or 
otherwise adversely affecting cultural, religious, nationalistic (or anti-
nationalistic), or other social values would be illegitimate. Likewise, state 
regulation of music with the objective of snuffing out emotional 
expression or experience would fall well outside the parameters of what 
we would accept as valid government action. Thus, under non-
consequentialist theories of speech, the cultural and emotional claims 
both also work as justifications for classifying instrumental music as 
speech under the First Amendment. 
Instrumental music is enigmatic. It both brings people together as a 
community and sets them apart as individuals, and on this paradox its 
true value as speech rests. That is not to say that instrumental music has 
to have a particularized meaning to be covered, only that whatever 
 
 299. Alexander, supra note 127, at 9. 
 300. Id. 
 301. Id. at 11. 
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meanings it conveys are not reducible to any message, but rather connect 
to culture and individuality in ways that are not, in fact, expressible. 
IV.  Other Implications for Free Speech Theory and Doctrine 
If any of these approaches to understanding musical expression 
provides a sound justification for protecting instrumental music as 
speech, it is worth considering what the implications of this conclusion 
are for First Amendment theory, as well as for doctrinal applications to 
other forms of speech that might be less widely accepted as protected.  
As indicated above, a substantial segment of recent First 
Amendment scholarship has been devoted to the “coverage” problem—
discourse about what types of expressive conduct, or even pure speech, 
are covered (though not necessarily protected) by the First Amendment, 
and which types simply do not count as speech, and are therefore not 
even subject to traditional First Amendment analysis.302 By closely 
analyzing the problem of instrumental music and speech—a presumably 
“easy” case under First Amendment analysis—we can see, and perhaps 
respond to, important tension points of free speech theory. Does 
Spence’s supposed “particularized message” requirement apply to all 
nonverbal modes of speech, or can expression that bears some other 
value but cannot be reduced to a message count as speech? Can the 
advancement of the search for truth include the protection of forms of 
nonverbal expression that engender close ties to cultural values and at 
the same time resist adherence to government orthodoxy about those 
values? Does expression that evokes purely emotional, as opposed to 
cognitive responses, qualify as speech such that its regulation implicates 
concerns about government overreaching and interference with personal 
autonomy for both speakers and listeners? 
In attempting to answer these questions, the close analysis of 
instrumental music suggests that perhaps these questions cannot be 
addressed by a completely internal legal approach. As Schauer argues, 
the notion of constitutional salience, which he describes as “the often 
mysterious political, social, cultural, historical, psychological, rhetorical, 
and economic forces that influence which policy questions surface as 
constitutional issues and which do not,”303 may require insights drawn 
from external sources. Aesthetic theory and music theory may be useful 
in determining the extent to which more unfamiliar types of expression 
might fit into the existing framework of thinking about speech. 
In addition to theoretical considerations, paying closer attention to 
the scope of the First Amendment’s coverage and the justifications for 
treating instrumental music as speech may lead to greater insights into 
 
 302. See supra note 14 and accompanying text. 
 303. Schauer, supra note 13, at 1768. 
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thorny doctrinal questions. First, some academic treatments of other 
areas of speech advocate an understanding of the First Amendment 
suggesting that speech that appeals to the noncognitive ought not to be 
covered. Schauer famously argues that pornography is not speech 
because its primary purpose is to produce purely physical, rather than 
mental, stimulation.304 In his view, pornography is more like a sexual aid 
than a form of expression.305 Similarly, as Cass Sunstein argues: 
[A]ny attempt to distinguish among categories of speech must start 
with an effort to isolate what is uniquely important about speech in the 
first place. Speech that is not intended to communicate a substantive 
message or that is directed solely to noncognitive capacities may be 
wholly or largely without the properties that give speech its special 
status. Subliminal advertising and hypnosis, for example, are entitled to 
less than full first amendment protection.306 
Like Schauer, Sunstein contends that pornography appeals solely to 
sexual arousal rather than cognitive reasoning.307 
Another context that relates to music as speech is, as Sunstein 
mentions, the regulation of subliminal or image-based advertising. 
Scholars argue that images used to sell tobacco products, such as the 
“Joe Camel” logo, can be constitutionally regulated because image 
advertising does not convey a “particularized message” that appeals to 
reasoning or cognition, but simply communicates a “generalized 
aesthetic impact producing an emotional response.”308 Indeed, in arguing 
for the lack of protection, one commentator suggests that image 
advertising is unprotected precisely because it is exactly like instrumental 
music.309 
Both of these examples suggest that the First Amendment does not 
cover expression that is designed to appeal purely to noncognitive, 
emotional functions. But one could extend the same argument to 
instrumental music. I have already argued the case for understanding 
music as a form of communication that is valuable because of its unique 
capacity to stir emotion. To the extent music has the capacity to appeal 
 
 304. Frederick Schauer, Speech and “Speech”—Obscenity and “Obscenity”: An Exercise in the 
Interpretation of Constitutional Language, 67 Geo. L.J. 899, 923 (1979). 
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 306. Cass R. Sunstein, Pornography and the First Amendment, 1986 Duke L.J. 589, 606 (emphasis 
added). For a trenchant and persuasive critique of Sunstein’s arguments, see Larry Alexander, Low 
Value Speech, 83 Nw. U. L. Rev. 547 (1989). 
 307. Sunstein, supra note 306, at 606. If we accept this to be true, then it is curious how the 
Supreme Court could exempt sexually explicit material that has “serious . . . artistic . . . value,” Miller 
v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973), from the definition of obscenity. Such material might not always 
appeal to cognitive capacities even if it is classified as art. 
 308. O. Lou Reed, Should the First Amendment Protect Joe Camel? Toward an Understanding of 
Constitutional “Expression”, 32 Am. Bus. L.J. 311, 349–50 (1995). 
 309. Id. at 341 n.131 (“[A] . . . piece of instrumental music is neither true nor false. It simply is. It 
may be expressive, but it is not speechlike.”). 
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to emotional sensibilities, or even to excite or create a “mood” that 
enhances the libido, it is also directed at and touches our noncognitive 
capacities and might, under these arguments, fall outside the bounds of 
the First Amendment. Conversely, if instrumental music is speech 
covered by the First Amendment, why don’t the same arguments for its 
inclusion mean that pornography and subliminal advertising are also 
speech, the regulation of which ought to be considered by courts? A 
partial response is that the argument for covering music under the First 
Amendment is not tied exclusively to its emotionally communicative 
value, but also to the notion of protecting cultural values and experience 
and distrust of government orthodoxy where cultural and other social 
values are concerned. Neither pornography nor subliminal advertising 
can be easily understood to advance a particular cultural value, at least 
not one recognized as culture in the common understanding of the term. 
In drawing these comparisons, I do not mean to be making a claim, 
either way, about whether pornography and subliminal messages always 
ought to be viewed as speech. However, if these types of expression are 
not covered by the First Amendment, I would argue that it is not because 
they lack a particularized message and appeal only to emotion rather 
than cognition. 
Finally, a richer understanding of how instrumental music 
communicates offers insights into free speech theory and doctrine as it 
applies to other artistic expression, and particularly to abstract, 
nonrepresentational painting, sculpture, and dance. As with music, there 
are no easy answers to these seemingly easy cases. But further efforts at 
increasing our understanding of these forms of expression should be 
encouraged. 
Coda 
In this Article, I have demonstrated the complexity involved with 
understanding instrumental music as a form of speech covered by the 
First Amendment. The value in such an enterprise is not entirely 
theoretical. Music continues to be suppressed around the globe by 
governments and other powerful institutional actors. A more complete 
understanding of its speech value and function is therefore critical to 
advancing free speech doctrine. 
Instrumental music does not convey a particularized message or 
idea, does not appeal to reason, and does not transmit thoughts or beliefs 
in an objectively identifiable form. Nonetheless, instrumental music is a 
unique way of expressing and experiencing culture, and also can be 
widely understood as an expression of or appeal to the senses in that it 
has the capacity to convey and evoke joy, sadness, anger, melancholy, 
and a multitude of other emotional responses. Both of these functions 
connect to important values of advancing the search for truth and 
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promoting individual self-realization. As such, instrumental music enjoys 
full status as speech under the First Amendment, even if it does not 
advance democracy in any direct, meaningful, or understandable 
manner. 
